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Abstract
The purpose of this dissertation is to contribute to our understanding of
scientific theory pursuit by providing a detailed case study on the development of
quantum theory.
In 1900, Max Planck introduced the notion of ‘energy elements’ into his attempt
to account for the observed anomalous blackbody radiation spectrum. Despite the
fact that the physical interpretation of this notion was ambiguous, a similar idea
was later taken up by several scientists. These investigations eventually led to the
formulation of quantum mechanics, one of our most successful physical theories to
date. However, the intervening years of study were marked by theoretical
uncertainty and inconsistency, during which time scientists had to proceed
according to a patchwork collection of principles and heuristics.
I first elaborate on why this case should be considered an instance of piecemeal
pursuit by presenting the historical ‘quantum conjectures’ that were being used in
different contexts. These conjectures gave quite varied interpretations of what
quantization might refer to. By comparing these conjectures, I identify a general
quantum postulate that captures the underlying assumption that is common to all
the cases. I argue that it is possible to consider a general postulate about
quantization even when its proper application is ambiguous in a given context, and
that the postulate can be separated from different elements of the framework being
used to investigate it.
I show that the quantum postulate can be deemed promising by analysing the
support it gains using a Bayesian framework. I first defend the use of such a
framework by considering the purported inconsistencies in Planck’s introduction of
his quantum conjecture and how we should handle these. I then explicate two cases
of support for the postulate. First, I show how we can use a particular solution to
the Bayesian problem of old evidence to interpret the support the quantum
postulate received by accounting for phenomena that had no previous explanation.
Finally, I show that the quantum postulate is also supported by a unification
argument, where unification is interpreted as informational relevance between the
different domains of inquiry.
Keywords: quantum postulate, context of pursuit, quantum theory, scientific
theories, history of physics, Bayesian epistemology, inconsistency, old evidence,
unification
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 The Context of pursuit
In the past few decades there has been growing acknowledgement of the idea that
philosophers of science can both learn from and contribute to the study of the
process of constructing scientific theories. Much of this discussion arose out of
Reichenbach’s famous distinction between the “context of discovery” and the
“context of justification,” first formulated in his (1938) article, where he calls the
first a matter of the “psychology of scientific discovery” and the latter a matter of
the “logic of science” (p. 36). Since then, this distinction has generally been
interpreted as a kind of division between the process of coming up with a scientific
theory, and the process of testing said theory in order to determine whether one is
justified in accepting it. For much of the twentieth century, the dominant view
among philosophers of science was that philosophical investigations should be
confined to the context of justification. For instance, Karl Popper believed that
there was no “logic of scientific discovery” despite the English title of his famous
work (1959). According to him, the process of discovery was a topic for empirical
psychology rather than logical analysis due to an ineliminable creative element, and
that the initial stage of conceiving or inventing a theory was not relevant for the
practice of philosophy (1959, p. 7). This separation of discovery and justification
arose from a belief that a hypothesis arrived at by pure luck or guesswork may still
be tested via methods we have determined to be well-justified and accepted as
scientific knowledge, despite its questionable origins. Of course, the process of
scientific inquiry does not proceed overwhelmingly by pure luck or guesswork, and it
is a rare occurrence for theories to simply present themselves to scientists wholesale,
ready for testing and subsequent acceptance or rejection.
2In recent years, some have argued that the distinction between discovery and
justification cannot be upheld (Arabatzis, 2006). Others have argued that
Reichenbach’s position was misinterpreted, and that the distinction was never
meant to be a temporal one, as a chronological division between initial discovery
and subsequent justification, but simply as a directive for separating out the
psychological components of theory construction from the justificatory ones
(Nickles, 1980b). Furthermore, the view began to emerge that the attempt to find
an infallible logical procedure for justification ignores the complicated processes
scientists actually undergo, and that a more historically oriented viewpoint can help
overcome this imbalance.
Several foci of study emerged from this line of thought. Some authors have
turned their attention to the investigation of methods by which scientific theories
are constructed or ‘discovered.’ Although there is a general consensus that there
exists no infallible set of rules by which scientists can construct new theories,
authors have drawn attention to important processes that are often used in such
development (Nickles 1980b, Meheus & Nickles 2009). Such analyses agree on the
idea that we should take into account the process of developing and constructing
theories. As a result, these studies tend to be focused on episodes of actual scientific
development, such as Lindley Darden’s work on the discovery of biological
mechanisms (Darden, 2009).
In addition to the work on the process of discovery, Larry Laudan (1977) argued
for an understanding of scientific growth primarily in terms of progress in solving
problems, and introduced the term ‘context of pursuit’ to draw attention to the fact
that before deciding whether to accept or reject a theory, scientists must determine
whether or not a fledgling theory is worth pursuing for a variety of reasons, both
epistemic and pragmatic, often in cases where the theory is not developed enough to
warrant acceptance in the usual sense. Laudan’s discussion centres on the question
of rationality in science in such contexts, but several authors have picked up on this
theme and introduced different ways to evaluate theories in the context of pursuit.
For instance, Laurie Anne Whitt argues for a combination of conceptual and
empirical dimensions to theory appraisal, and discusses possible indices of theory
promise focusing largely on the usefulness of analogies from a more established
domain to a newly developing line of inquiry (1992). More recent work by Dunja
Sˇesˇelja and Christian Straßer (2014) has discussed the question of epistemic
justification in the context of pursuit, where they have presented a coherentist
approach to evaluating theoretical frameworks. These authors also provide case
3studies to help support their analyses (Whitt 1990, Sˇesˇelja & Weber 2012). Peter
Achinstein has approached the topic of pursuit by considering general features of
the reasoning employed in this context that tend to differ from a purely justificatory
perspective, also using a case study (Achinstein, 1993). What these discussions have
in common is their characterization of pursuit as occurring after a theory has
already been articulated, at which point a judgment must be made about whether
to pursue it or not. This allows for a contrast with the context of discovery, before
such a theory exists, and the context of justification, at which time scientists are
deciding whether or not to accept such a theory.
The purpose of my dissertation is to contribute to our understanding of pursuit
by providing a detailed case study on the development of quantum theory. One
might consider this to be an investigation of the context of discovery rather than
pursuit, but I claim that one thing that becomes clear in my analysis is that pursuit
and discovery are not always easily separable. In what follows, I use the language of
‘pursuit’ but I do not see my project as being closer in kind to Laudan’s conception
of science than to those who choose the terminology of ‘discovery.’ Indeed, my case
study is concerned with both of these contexts, but I find that the language of
‘pursuit’ better captures the process in question than the term ‘logic of discovery.’ I
will also show that despite the fact that I characterize my project as one that is
focused on pursuit, there is an essential difference between my goal and that of
authors I have discussed above. This difference consists in the fact that authors like
Whitt and Sˇesˇelja & Straßer are trying to answer the question “Is a given theory
worth pursuing?” My analysis will instead focus on issues related to the queston,
“How should we proceed in the context of pursuit?” This means that I will be
concerned with how we can identify and evaluate promising features of theories in
this context. I will now introduce my case study, and explain why it is particularly
appropriate for an investigation of the process of pursuit.
1.2 Quantum theory as case study
In the latter years of the nineteenth century, various components of classical physics
— including classical mechanics and Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory — seemed to
be quite well confirmed by almost all experiments up to that point. However,
around that time, a few experimental results began to point to the inability of
classical theories to account for all phenomena. In 1900, Max Planck introduced a
notion of discretization, or quantization, in his treatment of a blackbody in an
4attempt to account for the observed radiation spectrum. Despite the fact that the
idea of quantization was ambiguous in terms of its specific physical interpretation, a
similar idea was later taken up by several scientists, most notably, Einstein and
Bohr. The investigations into quantization that took place during this time
eventually led to the formulation of quantum mechanics, one of our most successful
physical theories to date. However, the intervening years of study were marked by
theoretical uncertainty and inconsistency, during which time scientists had to
proceed according to a patchwork collection of principles and heuristics. There was
no theoretical framework that was even a candidate for acceptance, and so it is
difficult to see how we could characterize this as the justification of a theory.
Instead, we can consider this period as one in which scientists were engaged in
both discovery and pursuit. On the one hand, we might say that scientists were
working to discover the theory of quantum mechanics, where ‘discovery’ refers to
the first articulation of the modern mathematical form of the theory. On the other
hand, this period provides an excellent example of scientists working in the context
of pursuit. For instance, Planck’s work is often referred to as his ‘theory of
blackbody radiation’, and Bohr’s work is often referred to as the ‘old quantum
theory.’ Scientists evidently judged each of these individual theories to be worth
pursuing. However, one theme that will arise from my analysis is that an
understanding of pursuit in one individual context must take into account its
relation to the other domains, despite the absence of an overall coherent framework
in which all of these investigations could be situated.
There is a significant amount of work addressing the modern formulation and
interpretation of quantum mechanics, as well as many treatments of the ‘old
quantum theory,’ beginning with Bohr’s atomic model of 1913. However, despite the
fact that the developments of 1900 to 1913 are historically well-documented, the
philosophical literature on this period is more limited. While John Norton has
written on this topic, his focus has been on the justification of certain aspects of the
theory, in the traditional sense of justification as making it reasonable to accept the
ideas in question, primarily through deductive arguments.1 Leplin (1980) and
Nickles (1980a) recognise the significance of this period, and both refer to it as an
example in their suggestions of how to understand the process of pursuit. However,
this period has not yet been subject to a detailed historical analysis from the
perspective of theory pursuit. I submit that such an analysis yields insights on
1See for instance Norton (1987) on Planck’s theory of blackbody radiation and Norton (1993)
for an analysis of the argument for quantization.
5scientific methodology and, in particular, for the process of pursuit in the absence of
an overarching theory that is guiding the inquiry.
By restricting my attention to the years roughly up to 1913, I focus on the ways
in which quantization was applied in different experimental contexts, and how this
advanced the development of quantum theory in a ‘piecemeal’ manner. My purpose
is to provide a reconstruction of the arguments made and experiments performed
during this developmental period in order to better understand the process of
piecemeal pursuit that I claim was operative at the time.2 The term ‘piecemeal
pursuit’ is meant to reflect several facts. First, the notion of quantization was being
deemed promising in various contexts, but there was no overarching theoretical
framework, and so the investigation of quantization had to be pieced together from
application in these different domains. Second, each domain was itself something of
a piecemeal investigation, since elements of classical theories were being used in
conjunction with conjectures and hypotheses that did not clearly fit within classical
frameworks.
In what follows, I take it as given that scientists were interested in the notion of
quantization because it had the potential to solve unaddressed problems, and that
they were trying to construct a theory that could account both for the successes of
classical physics, and that included some kind of quantum postulate. This attitude
of situating scientists in the midst of pursuit is nicely summed up by Planck in the
Preface to the Second Edition of his Theory of Heat Radiation:
[I]t follows from the nature of the case that it will require painstaking
experimental and theoretical work for many years to come to make
gradual advances in the new field. Any one who, at present, devotes his
efforts to the hypothesis of quanta, must, for the time being, be content
with the knowledge that the fruits of the labor spent will probably be
gathered by a future generation. (Planck, 1913/1914, p. ix)
My analysis provides a more detailed explanation of how and why such a
postulate had the potential to succeed in this endeavour.
2That said, some of the experimental work I discuss, such as Millikan’s work on the
photoelectric effect, occurred after 1913. I include it because it is directly related to specific
elements of theoretical work that arose before this date, and was relatively disconnected to the
theoretical developments in quantum theory that were occurring after this date.
61.3 Formal framework
I will be limiting my analysis to broadly epistemic factors. While I would certainly
not deny that science is a social activity, and that a full understanding of whether it
is wise to pursue a theory will take social and pragmatic factors into account, I put
these considerations aside for the purpose of this particular study. Furthermore,
none of what I will say hinges on a particular conception of the end goal of science
beyond a commitment to its adequacy in accounting for the phenomena in which we
are interested. Part of my goal is to show that many of the same epistemological
features we take to be indicative of justification are also applicable when we
consider whether a theory is worth pursuing or not, but this does not mean that
such features necessarily indicate truth. In parts of my analysis, I will use Bayesian
epistemological tools. Specifically, I will be working within a framework very similar
to the one Abner Shimony calls ‘tempered personalism’ (1970). There are several
reasons that make this epistemological framework appropriate for my purposes.
First, consider John Earman’s characterization of theory acceptance.
[T]here is no natural Bayesian explication of theory acceptance, save in
the case where the probability of the theory is 1. Since scientists qua
judges of theories are almost never in a position to justify such an
acceptance, the Bayesian prediction is that rarely is a theory accepted in
the epistemic sense. Similarly, when theory choice is a matter of
deciding what theory to devote one’s time and energy to, the Bayesian
prediction is that in typical situations where members of the community
assign different utilities to such devotions, they will make different
choices. Thus, from either the epistemic or practical perspective, the
Bayesian prediction is for diversity. (Earman, 1992, p. 194)
I will be arguing that this diversity of views is an important part of the kind of
theory pursuit I am interested in. In particular, we will see that scientists tried to
give different physical explanations of experimental results, and that scientists had
different levels of commitment to various claims. This framework is thus suited for
an examination of the pursuit of a quantum theory. Shimony’s view in particular
captures what I consider to be my general purpose for using Bayesian epistemology.
That is, I consider probabilistic reasoning one of the best ways to formalize some of
the steps of scientific inference, and I believe that it can yield results that are not
obvious without the formalization. I thus treat it as a useful tool that provides
7normative recommendations for a rational agent in understanding the relations
between a claim and its support, as well as between different pieces of evidence.
Another important feature of tempered personalism is that “the individual
investigation delimits an area in which probabilities are calculated” (Shimony, 1970,
p. 99). Thus, in our case, probabilities are assigned in the context of particular
investigations of energy quantization. How this is being done will be discussed in
more detail, but it fits well with the notion of piecemeal pursuit since I claim that
the idea of quantization was being investigated in various disparate domains.
Finally, the ‘tempered’ part of tempered personalism comes from the prescription of
open-mindedness towards new, seriously proposed hypotheses; that is, scientists
should at least consider such hypotheses when there are good reasons to do so.
Although we will need to make judgments that are not prescribed by the Bayesian
framework to determine whether a hypothesis is a serious proposal, I take this to be
a good general methodological rule. We will thus see that there were uses of the
idea of quantization that were applied in cases that were ultimately unsuccessful,
but it would be unreasonable to expect that they should have been ruled out at the
outset.3
Furthermore, I believe that the use of this framework helps to sharpen some
methodological points. For one thing, we see that the use of this framework requires
that in each particular context, we must make an effort to clarify what information
should be included in the background knowledge. This will result in a closer
identification of the kinds of assumptions scientists were making when considering
various experimental results to be evidence for quantization. This will also lead to
an examination of how perceived inconsistencies in these background assumptions
were treated. For another thing, in order to evaluate probabilities in any meaningful
way, we will need to be able to link the hypothesis with evidence statements, and I
argue that this requires the inclusion of the parameter h. This helps to highlight the
fact that it was the introduction of Planck’s constant that turned experimental
results into evidence for a hypothesis of quantization, and not a hypothesis about
the specific mechanism that caused the observed behaviour of energy.
As an added benefit, this analysis can contribute to the project of Bayesian
epistemology by providing a plausible example of how it can be used in real
3There are also more specific elements of tempered personalism that make it an appropriate
characterization of the reasoning I am interested in, such as the assignment of degree of belief 0 to
the belief that a given theory is literally true, but these will be considered in more detail in later
chapters.
8scientific contexts. While the tools being developed in Bayesian epistemology are
becoming more powerful, the literature linking these concepts to historical case
studies has not appeared to keep pace. By applying elements of this case study to
Bayesian analyses of specific theoretical features, I am able to evaluate the
appropriateness of these analyses as explications of scientific reasoning. Specifically,
I evaluate a particular Bayesian solution to the problem of old evidence by deciding
whether it is a good explication of the reasoning operative at the time, and consider
how the solution needs to be modified to properly capture the case.
1.4 Argument structure
In what follows, I will first elaborate on why this case should be considered an
instance of piecemeal pursuit by presenting the historical ‘quantum conjectures’
that were being used in different contexts to account for anomalous behaviour.
These conjectures all made use of the notion of quantization, but gave quite varied
interpretations of what this quantization might refer to. By comparing these
conjectures, I identify a general quantum postulate that captures the underlying
assumption that is common to all of them. This shows that it is possible to consider
a general postulate about quantization even when the proper way to apply or
interpret the postulate is ambiguous in a given context.
In Chapter 3, I argue that the quantum postulate can be separated in an
epistemic sense from different elements of the framework being used to investigate
it. This is done by examining the way that the particular quantum conjecture of
light quanta guided research in the context of experiments on the photoelectric
effect. While the conjecture of light quanta was crucial for the investigation of this
phenomenon, I argue that the experimental results forced agreement on a general
postulate about quantization, but did not provide direct support for the existence of
light quanta.
I go on to show that the quantum postulate can be deemed promising by
analysing the support it gains using a Bayesian framework. The main task of
Chapter 4 is to defend the use of the tempered personalist framework by considering
the purported inconsistencies in Planck’s introduction of his quantum conjecture
and how we should handle these. I also give a brief example of how we can use the
framework to explicate support by way of correct prediction in the case of the
photoelectric effect. In the next two chapters, I use the Bayesian framework to
explicate two special cases of support for the quantum postulate. I first show how
9we can use a particular soution to the Bayesian problem of old evidence to interpret
the support the quantum postulate received by accounting for certain phenomena
that had no previous explanation in Chapter 5. In so doing, I evaluate and provide
some modifications to the solution in question that I claim arise naturally out of
historical considerations. Finally, in Chapter 6, I show that the quantum postulate
is also supported by a unification argument, where unification should be interpreted
as informational relevance of the various disparate domains of inquiry.
From the above arguments, I extrapolate some general conclusions about the
process of piecemeal pursuit, arising from both the relation of the specific domains
of applicability to the quantum postulate, and features of the postulate itself. For
one thing, this characterization helps to demonstrate how a general postulate can be
supported by evidence from a particular domain, even when the postulate itself is
not an explicit part of the framework being used in that context. This shows that
we can identify specific elements of theories that are promising, even when there is
no overall theoretical framework that is guiding the investigation. Furthermore,
experimental results can be interpreted in such a way as to develop a new theory,
even when experiments are conducted largely in the framework of the old theory.
We are also able to see that the quantum postulate was promising due to its
combination of wide applicability, and specificity. The wide applicability of a
postulate is important not only because scientists may happen upon an appropriate
application, but also because these applications help scientists narrow down to a
common core that is supported in each context that should be the focus of further
inquiry. However, this wide applicability must be tempered by a form of specificity,
which in this case takes the form of the inclusion of Planck’s constant h. Not only
does this specificity allow for features such as prediction and accounting for evidence
to gain support, the inclusion of this constant allows the experimental results to
yield information about the postulate itself in the form of measurements of the
constant. The importance of the quantum postulate is borne out by features that
persisted in the transition from the piecemeal application of quantum conjectures to
the theory of quantum mechanics. The fundamental quantum of action h continues
to play a crucial role in quantum mechanics, and though our understanding of the
concept is different, the basic idea of quantization of action remains.
Overall, this analysis shows that the feature of promise need not attach to entire
theories. Instead, we can consider specific elements of emerging theories, and so the
pursuit of a theory, or a particular part of a theory, can be deemed promising even if
the theory as a whole contains theoretical weaknesses or even inconsistencies. In
10
this case, a ‘quantum theory’ was not a fully consistent theory, and certainly not a
candidate for acceptance. Nevertheless, there were specific components of the ideas
found at that time that we can see were worth pursuing for empirical reasons.
As a reconstruction of an argument, I do not claim that my representation
always accurately captures the thought processes of the scientific community at the
time. However, as an account of pursuit, I consider it important to deal primarily
with information that was generally known at the time, lest the reconstruction
become an idealized and unachievable norm. Thus, although my project is one of
philosophical reconstruction, historical facts about the nature of evidence available
at the time play a crucial role. Indeed, in this sense, I take to heart Smith’s (2010)
comments on the relation between history and philosophy of science: a philosophical
account of support for a claim must take into account the kinds of things that were
considered evidence for that claim by attending to history. This approach allows me
to supplement a formal analysis that makes normative claims about how an agent
should reason with historical content.
11
Chapter 2
Quantum Conjectures in
1900–1916
2.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, I argued for the importance of better understanding the
context of pursuit when pursuit occurs as a piecemeal process, and suggested that a
case study on the early development of quantum theory could help us gain insight
into this process. In this chapter, I further explain why we should consider this as
an instance of piecemeal pursuit. To this end, I present an overview of some of the
ways that the idea of quantization was being applied in physics from the years 1900
to 1916. I will distinguish between several distinct ‘quantum conjectures’ that were
being used in different domains to try to explain anomalous behaviour, and argue
that we can extract a general ‘quantum postulate’ from these conjectures that
captures the core common assumption among these uses.
One of the central assumptions in classical physics is the idea that energy is
correctly described in continuous terms. However, in the late nineteenth-century,
various experiments and observations began to point to the inadequacy of classical
theories in accounting for certain phenomena. Max Planck’s introduction of “energy
elements” in 1900 as a way to recover the behaviour of blackbody radiation was a
groundbreaking step in physics, and was followed by other applications of the idea
of quantized amounts of energy by scientists in diverse contexts. However, these
were not simply applications of a single, unambiguous hypothesis of energy
quantization. Planck’s quantum conjecture had to do with the interaction between
electromagnetic radiation and matter. Einstein, in his work on light quanta,
12
characterized electromagnetic radiation itself as being quantized. He also applied a
quantum conjecture to the description of the energy of a physical molecule in his
work on the specific heats of solids. Bohr used a quantum conjecture to define the
stable states of an atom to account for the emission spectra of hydrogen gas. Thus,
these tentative conjectures were based on quite different assumptions about the
physical reasons for quantization. Indeed, it would be more accurate to characterize
Planck, Einstein and Bohr as appealing to various members of a family of quantum
conjectures, all regarding the behaviour of energy in particular contexts. Despite
these differences, there was clearly an important commonality among these
conjectures, as evidenced by the fact that this body of work eventually led to the
development of a quantum theory.
There is no shortage of detailed historical treatments of the idea of energy
quantization in the period from 1900 to 1916.1 Such work frequently draws
attention to Planck’s reluctance in accepting Einstein’s proposal of light quanta, as
well as Einstein’s claim that Planck’s ideas were a much more drastic break from
classical theories of energy than Planck himself believed.2 These disagreements were
ostensibly about the import of the idea of energy quantization for a possible revision
of classical physics, so this issue is closely related to the question of exactly how and
where a hypothesis of quantized energy is applicable. Philosophers who are
interested in the process of theory pursuit have noted the importance of this period.
For instance, Leplin (1980) refers to this period as an example of the process of
theory construction and mentions the quantization of energy in various forms.
Nickles (1980a) discusses how scientists at this time were able to rationally violate
what one might have taken to be general constraints on theory development in
seeking to solve particular problems. The historical accounts all present these varied
applications as important steps in the pursuit and construction of a quantum
theory. While I certainly do not wish to deny that this is true, I believe that the
very fact that these differences exist has important implications for the
characterization of theory pursuit and, to my knowledge, an analysis that takes this
into account has not yet been provided.
Although there is no general consensus about the proper way to characterize the
end goal of a physical theory, I will assume for my purposes that a theory must at
least be empirically adequate over the domain it purports to cover. Thus, in the
1Among others cited, see for instance Barkan (1993), Darrigol (1992), Mehra & Rechenberg
(1982).
2See Kuhn (1978), Klein (1965).
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context of my discussion, I assume that scientists were trying to construct a theory
that could both incorporate new ideas about quantization in order to account for
observations that were anomalous in the framework of classical theories, while
maintaining the successes of those classical theories in the domains where they were
highly accurate. My main goal in this chapter will be first, to articulate what was
common between the conjectures and second, to argue that if we accept the idea
that this particular quantum postulate was being supported by various experimental
phenomena, we must recognise the fact that this postulate should be divorced from
the specific physical assumptions underlying it in each case, and instead be seen as
indicating that a change is required at the level of fundamental kinematical laws of
classical theories. I will not be concerned here with exactly how the quantum
conjectures were being supported by the various experimental phenomena: the
explication of the nature of this support will be the role of later chapters. For now, I
take for granted that each discussed phenomenon does indeed provide support for
the idea of quantization.
The chapter will proceed as follows. The next section presents in detail the
different quantum conjectures of Planck, Einstein, and Bohr that I have already
mentioned. In each case, I carry out a brief exposition of the work in question,
drawing attention to the differences between the conjectures in terms of the physical
assumptions that the conjectures imply. I then argue that, despite these differences,
we can articulate a statement that I call “the quantum postulate,” abbreviated QP ,
that picks out a common assumption between its various uses, and that I formulate
as follows: “There is a universal, nonzero parameter h with the dimensions of action
(energy · time) that can be used to impose a quantization condition on quantities
that were previously considered to be continuous in such a way that reduces to the
specific conjectures in each of the domains.” I submit that this captures the core
assumption common to all the appeals to quantized energy, and that it is not tied to
a particular physical cause of experimental results. Indeed, I show that scientists
themselves were not committed to the physical causes of quantized behaviour.
Finally, I will explain how the quantum postulate as I have articulated it possesses a
combination of the features of wide applicability and specificity. The wide
applicability is important not only for pragmatic reasons, but also because this is
what allows for the identification of a common core between its various applications.
In this case, the fact that the postulate was applicable in increasingly diverse ways
indicated that a conceptual change was required in certain fundamental classical
descriptions of the world. However, any such description would need to be very
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specific, in the sense that we would require a precise way of interpreting the
observations of relevant phenomena. Here, the specificity comes by way of an
inclusion of the parameter h. These features will be important for my analyses of
evidence for the postulate in subsequent chapters.
2.2 The quantum conjectures
2.2.1 Blackbody radiation
It was the investigation of blackbody radiation which first gave rise to the
consideration of an explicit quantum conjecture by Planck. In this chapter, I will
not discuss how Planck arrived at his formula for the emission spectrum of
blackbody radiation.3 I focus instead on Planck’s attempt to provide a theoretical
interpretation of this radiation equation and his appeal to the idea of quantization.
We will see that there are various ways in which we might interpret Planck’s
quantum conjecture, and it is not clear which version should be attributed to him if
it is even indeed the case that he was committed to a single meaning.
The formula for the spectrum of blackbody radiation suggested by Planck and
confirmed by experiments at both high and low frequency is given by the expression
u =
8pihν3
c3
· 1
ehν/kT − 1 , (2.1)
where u is the energy density as a function of ν, the frequency of radiation, T is the
temperature, and h and k are constants introduced by Planck. We now call k
Boltzmann’s constant, and h Planck’s constant. The attempt to provide a
theoretical explanation for this experimentally confirmed equation is what gave rise
to the idea of quantization. Planck employed a model of a blackbody that arose out
of Kirchhoff’s Law, which posited that the behaviour of radiation was independent
of the specific properties of the system. He thus incorporated Hertzian resonators in
this description — small, nonresistive, oscillating electric circuits. Since no theory of
electrons existed at the time, Planck used the simplest model possible.4
In his 1901 presentation of the derivation of the radiation law, Planck drew on
previous work to outline the problem. As he already had a relation between the
3This will be discussed in Chapter 4. For helpful treatments, see Klein (1961), Kuhn (1978),
Gearhart (2002).
4Planck was drawing on his earlier work in thermal radiation in which he modeled a system as
composed of these resonators. See Darrigol (1992), p. 35.
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energy density u and the mean energy E of a single resonator, as well as relations
between E and temperature T by way of the entropy S of a single resonator, a
major part of Planck’s task was to determine the relation between E and S, the
mean energy and entropy of a single resonator in the system. To do this, he
considered a large number N of identical resonators, and took the total entropy of
the resonators SN to be k logW + const, in analogy to the entropy found in kinetic
gas theory. In order to find a value for W , the probability that the system of
resonators possesses energy UN , Planck assumed that the energy can be considered
in portions of yet undetermined size . Rather than simply taking the limit as → 0
as one would expect for continuous amounts of energy, he used this discretized
consideration of the energy UN to calculate the number of ways the energy elements
could be divided between the N resonators, thus yielding a value for W . This
yielded an expression for SN in terms of energy E and energy element , and in
turn, an expression for the entropy S of a single resonator. The form of S is
restricted by Wien’s displacement law, which gives a relation between the radiation
density of a frequency range and the temperature of the body. This yielded the
result that  must be proportional to ν, and Planck introduces the constant h to
express that proportionality as  = hν. The last part of the paper is dedicated to
calculating numerical values for Boltzmann’s constant k and Planck’s universal
constant h based on experimental work on blackbody radiation.5
The foregoing is a simplified version of Planck’s presentation of 1901, which also
differed from his 1900 presentation. Nevertheless, we can extract much of interest
from this and Planck’s subsequent work on radiation. The main point will be that it
is possible to attribute two different quantum conjectures to Planck, and that it is
not clear which of these Planck was genuinely committed to, if he indeed had a
single conjecture in mind. Both conjectures will arise from an interpretation of the
“energy element”  = hν, and what it might mean for energy of frequency ν to be
considered in amounts of .
One way to read Planck’s quantization condition is to attribute the
discontinuous nature of energy to the behaviour of the resonators modeling the
blackbody. In this case, one assumes only that we must describe the energy that a
single resonator possesses in integral multiples of hν. This is how historians such as
Klein have read Planck, who says for instance “Planck had quantized only the
5Many will be familiar with the fact that some of Planck’s assumptions here appeared to be
inconsistent. While I will have more to say on this matter in the next chapter when I address the
issue of how experiments supported the quantum postulate, it is not crucial for my purposes here.
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energy of the material oscillators and not the radiation” (Klein, 1961, p. 477). This
is also how Einstein explicates Planck’s assumption: “The energy of an elementary
resonator can only assume values that are integral multiples of hν; by emission and
absorption, the energy of a resonator changes by jumps of integral multiples of hν”
(Einstein, 1906/1989, p. 195).6 In 1901, in describing the total energy of the
resonators, Planck writes,
Es kommt nun darauf an, die Wahrscheinlichkeit W dafu¨r zu finden,
dass die N Resonatoren insgesamt die Schwingungsenergie UN besitzen.
Hierzu ist es notwendig, UN nicht als eine stetige, unbeschra¨nkt teilbare,
sondern als eine discrete, aus einer ganzen Zahl von endlichen gleichen
Teilen zusammengesetzte Gro¨sse aufzufassen. (p. 556)
or,
It is now a matter of finding the probability W , so that the N resonators
together possess the vibrational energy UN . Here, it is necessary to
interpret UN not as a continuous, infinitely divisible quantity, but as a
discrete quantity composed of an integral number of finite equal parts.
Planck later developed this idea further into a conjecture that the oscillators
could absorb energy continuously, but could only emit it in quantized amounts. For
instance, in the 1913 edition of his Theory of Heat Radiation, he writes,
Whereas the absorption of radiation by an oscillator takes place in a
perfectly continuous way, so that the energy of the oscillator increases
continuously and at a constant rate, for its emission we have . . . the
following law: The oscillator emits in irregular intervals, subject to the
laws of chance; it emits, however, only at a moment when its energy of
vibration is just equal to an integral multiple n of the elementary
quantum  = hν, and then it always emits its whole energy of vibration
n. (Planck, 1913/1914, p. 161)
This particular quantum conjecture is thus that an oscillator of frequency ν can
only emit energy in integral amounts hν, despite the fact that we would have
previously assumed that there was no discrete restriction on this quantity.
6I have changed Einstein’s Rβ/N to h for consistency of notation.
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An alternative reading of Planck’s quantum conjecture is that he was specifically
imposing a quantization condition on the phase space of a resonator when
calculating its entropy. Let us consider Planck’s words when introducing the notion
of energy elements in 1900.
If E is considered to be a continuously divisible quantity, this
distribution is possible in infinitely many ways. We consider, however —
this is the most essential point of the whole calculation — E to be
composed of a very definite number of equal parts and use thereto the
constant of nature h = 6.55 · 10−27erg · sec. This constant multiplied by
the common frequency ν of the resonators gives us the energy element 
in erg, and dividing E by  we get the number P of energy elements
which must be divided over the N resonators. If the ratio is not an
integer, we take for P an integer in the neighbourhood. (Planck,
1900/1967, p. 84)
The inclusion of the caveat, “in case P is not an integer,” seems to indicate that
he considers the possibility that the energy elements are merely a convenient
calculational device, and do not reflect a physical fact. To better understand what
this might mean, I return to Planck’s calculation of the entropy of a single
resonator, which required a determination of the probability W of a state of the
system. Although Planck was guided by Boltzmann’s earlier statistical treatment of
the kinetic theory of gases, his treatment differs from Boltzmann’s in an important
way. First of all, Boltzmann was clear that his division of phase space into regions
was merely a calculational convenience, and he quickly went on to consider the
limiting case where the elements go to zero (Kuhn, 1978). For Boltzmann, the size
of the partition is not important since, for an ideal gas, changing the size of a
phase-space element changes the entropy by an additive constant, but in classical
thermodynamics, only entropy differences are physically significant. In Planck’s
work however, the size of the partition is of crucial importance because it determines
the probability W of a thermodynamic state, which in turn determines the absolute
value of the entropy. In this context, the absolute value of the entropy is meaningful
because it is needed to recover the radiation law. In the second edition of his Theory
of Heat Radiation, Planck describes the elements in phase space as follows:
That such a definite finite quantity really exists is a characteristic
feature of the theory we are developing, as contrasted with that due to
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Boltzmann, and forms the content of the so-called hypothesis of quanta
(Planck, 1913/1914, p. 125).
Kuhn has argued that this kind of conjecture should not be connected to
quantization of energy specifically. It is not clear what physical significance we
should attribute to this specific partition of phase space.
These two conjectures show that even the mere introduction of the idea of
quantization was ambiguous in terms of its physical interpretation. However, we
note that its application was limited to the phenomenon of blackbody radiation,
and the interaction between radiation and matter, since this is what Planck was
attempting to understand at this time. In the next quantum conjectures, we will see
that the idea of quantization was applied beyond this domain.
2.2.2 Light quanta
The first notion of quantized energy in Einstein’s work appeared in his 1905 paper
on light quanta. He begins this paper by saying that the wave theory of light “has
been excellently justified for the representation of purely optical phenomena and it
is unlikely ever to be replaced by another theory,” thus indicating his commitment
to classical methods and concepts in many contexts (Einstein, 1905, p. 91).
However, he points out that these equations govern observations of optical
phenomena which refer to averages over time rather than instantaneous values, the
fact of which raises the possibility of different laws governing light phenomena on a
different timescale, such as its creation and conversion. These considerations lead
Einstein to suggest that the idea of quantization should be applied to light itself
rather than in the interaction of radiation with matter.
Einstein first shows that when assuming the validity of the doctrine of
equipartition to describe the velocities of the molecules, using Maxwell’s theory to
analyse the energy of resonators and gas molecules in a volume surrounded by
reflecting walls leads to the prediction that the amount of radiation will continue to
grow with the frequency of radiation, a result we now refer to as the ultraviolet
catastrophe. Einstein saw the potential in Planck’s work for solving this problem,
but provided a more rigorous underpinning for the idea of quantization.
He proceeds to the suggestion of light quanta by considering the entropy in a
system of radiation. He proves that the entropy of monochromatic radiation of
sufficiently small density varies with volume according to the same rules as the
entropy of a perfect gas or dilute solution, then continues in an analogy with the
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kinetic theory of gases by interpreting this entropy as a function of the probability
of the state. By comparing the expression for the entropy of the system of
monochromatic radiation with the expression for entropy according to Boltzmann’s
principle, Einstein is able to conclude that “Monochromatic radiation of low density
behaves . . . in a thermodynamic sense, as if it consisted of mutually independent
energy quanta of magnitude hν” (1905, p. 102).
There are several features of Einstein’s work here that indicate that he is not
simply applying Planck’s quantization conjecture, but is instead providing his own
version of such a conjecture that is merely inspired by Planck’s work. First is the
fact that he provides a different argument to justify the appeal to such a hypothesis.
While Planck was representing a blackbody as a system of vibrating resonators that
could absorb and emit energy, Einstein considered a system with n moving points in
a given volume, in analogy with gaseous systems. In contrast, Planck’s appeal to
Boltzmann’s work in the kinetic theory of gases seems to stem primarily from its
mathematical expediency in leading to the correct radiation formula. Einstein’s
analogy with kinetic theory is carefully formulated so that although its applicability
is limited only to domains of low-density radiation, the argument is much better
grounded than Planck’s.7
Most importantly, Einstein’s quantum conjecture is given specifically in terms of
light phenomena. He presents the major assumption of this paper as follows:
According to the assumption considered here, when a light ray starting
from a point is propagated, the energy is not continuously distributed
over an ever increasing volume, but it consists of a finite number of
energy quanta, localised in space, which move without being divided and
which can be absorbed or emitted only as a whole. (Einstein, 1905/1967,
p. 92)
Therefore, this assumption is applicable to phenomena that Planck never
considered, such as Stokes’s law, the ionisation of gases, and the photoelectric effect.
While we will see evidence below that the degree to which Einstein was genuinely
committed to a literal interpretation of physical light quanta is questionable, it is
significant that his conjecture refers to radiation in vacuo in a way that Planck’s
clearly does not. Indeed, there is nothing in Planck’s discussions of blackbody
radiation that indicate that his conjecture of quantized energy was meant to be
exported to other domains.
7See Norton (2006) for a reconstruction of the reasoning.
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[P]revious electron theories suffer from an essential incompleteness which
demands a modification, but how deeply this modification should go into
the structure of the theory is a question upon which views are still
widely divergent. . . . [Some physicists, including Einstein] even believe
that the propagation of electromagnetic waves in a pure vacuum does
not occur precisely in accordance with the Maxwellian field equations,
but in definite energy quanta hν. I am of the opinion, on the other
hand, that at present it is not necessary to proceed in so revolutionary a
manner, and that one may come successfully through by seeking the
significance of the energy quantum hν solely in the mutual actions with
which the resonators influence one another. (Planck, 1909/1915, p. 68)
Thus, the suggestion of light quanta is evidently a more radical use of
quantization than Planck’s quantization of oscillator energy. Einstein’s subsequent
work on the specific heat of solids stretched the idea of quantization even further.
2.2.3 Specific heats
At the beginning of the twentieth century, a problem with the theory of specific
heats loomed over the scientific community. Lord Kelvin, in a lecture to the Royal
Society in 1900 described it as a “cloud which has obscured the brilliance of the
molecular theory of heat and light during the last quarter of the nineteenth
century,” (1901, p. 527). Despite the many successes of the atomic-molecular theory
of gases, the application of the Maxwell-Boltzmann doctrine of the equipartition of
energy demanded by classical physics yielded mixed results in the prediction of
specific heats of various substances. This doctrine posited that a substance in
thermal equilibrium had its energy equally divided between all its available degrees
of freedom. More specifically, each degree of freedom should contribute (1/2)kT to
the energy. However, its use in the prediction of specific heats of many common
monatomic and diatomic gases were at variance with observed values. Furthermore,
while its application in the Dulong-Petit law successfully predicted the specific heats
of certain crystalline structures at high temperatures, the same law yielded values
that were significantly higher than the observed values for substances such as
diamond at room temperature.8 In what follows, I will not address the quantum
8The Dulong-Petit law provided the molar specific heat capacity of a substance as a constant
with units Joules/Kelvin. This constant is now expressed as 3R, where R is the universal gas
constant. It is also worth noting that while this law can be understood in terms of the
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treatment of gases, since a fuller treatment of such phenomena was not forthcoming
until later years.9 However, as early as 1907, Einstein was able to use a quantum
conjecture quite successfully in accounting for the values that were lower than
expected of the specific heats of certain solids and, in particular, that of diamond.
Einstein’s 1907 paper was the first attempt at using a quantum conjecture in a
context other than that of radiation phenomena. He proposed that the idea that
energy should be considered in quantized amounts be applied to the energy of
molecules of solids and. In his explication, Einstein did not require that the energy
take on exact quantities, but only that the energy take on values infinitesimally
close to discrete values (Einstein, 1907/1989, p. 217). Using this conjecture in
combination with a canonical distribution to describe the system, he calculated the
mean energy of an oscillator with frequency ν,10
E¯ =
(R/N0)hν/k
ehν/kT − 1 . (2.2)
By making the simplifying assumption that all the atomic vibrations were
independent and of the same frequency ν, Einstein was able to calculate the average
energy of one oscillator (1907, p. 186). The energy of one mole of such a solid would
be
E = 3R
hν/k
ehν/kT − 1 , (2.3)
and the specific heat can be calculated by differentiating the energy with respect to
temperature. Note that as kT/hν approaches 0, hν/kT grows large, and the
expression goes to 0. In the limit as kT/hν goes to 1 (and larger), the expression
takes the value of 3R. As Klein explains, “If the specific heat is plotted as a
function of temperature, or rather of (Tk/hν), one obtains a curve that rises
smoothly and monotonically from zero at the origin and approaches the
equipartition value, 3R, asymptotically, when (Tk/hν) becomes large” (1965, p.
176). We can see the resulting graph from Einstein’s 1907 paper in Figure 2.1.
equipartition theorem, it was first proposed as a phenomenological law to describe the observed
specific heat capacities of certain substances.
9We now know that these divergences between predictions and observations occur because of
quantum effects at relatively low temperatures. Roughly, some degrees of freedom require a certain
minimum temperature before they are activated and can store energy, so certain substances at low
temperatures have low specific heats.
10I have written Einstein’s equations replacing the constant β with the equivalent h/k to render
my notation consistent.
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Figure 2.1: Graph of dE/dT from Einstein (1907)
The contradictions between the experimental observations and theoretical
predictions based on equipartition occurred primarily among lighter atoms, which
could be expected to vibrate at higher frequencies. Einstein’s quantized treatment
thus fit well with these observations since they would be expected not to conform to
the equipartition predictions, but to be much lower. For the first time, there was a
plausible explanation for why the specific heats of these substances were so much
lower than the Dulong-Petit values.
This version of a quantum conjecture is clearly a much broader interpretation of
the notion of energy quantization, despite the fact that Einstein’s argument for this
energy quantization is based on ideas in Planck’s radiation theory. Having begun
the paper by showing that the molecular-kinetic theory of heat combined with
Planck’s relation between the average energy of an oscillator and the radiation
density yields the untenable Rayleigh-Jeans law, Einstein concludes that the
molecular-kinetic theory must be amended in some way in order to obtain the
experimentally verified Equation 2.1. As Einstein phrases it, “this stipulation
involved the assumption that the energy of the elementary structure under
consideration assumes only values that are infinitesimally close to 0, , 2, etc.”
(1907/1989, p. 217). He explains, “we had to make the assumption that the
mechanism of energy transfer is such that the energy of elementary structures can
only assume the values 0, hν, 2hν, etc.” (p. 218). Therefore, the idea of energy
quantization here refers specifically to the idea that the phase space of an oscillator
of frequency ν is not equally occupied over time; instead, a system occupies only
those regions that correspond to energy of integral multiples of hν. This conjecture
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was thus not limited to the context of radiation, but any elementary structure that
could be modeled as an oscillator. In this context, the energy of an oscillator has to
do with its position and momentum, which seems prima facie to be unrelated to the
constitution of electromagnetic radiation. Thus, Einstein’s quantum conjecture here
presents another very different application of the idea of quantization.
2.2.4 Atomic theory
The final quantum conjectures I will address come out of Bohr’s model of the
hydrogen atom.11 Bohr motivates his 1913 paper by noting that certain
experimental results on α-ray scattering seem to support Rutherford’s atomic
model, but that this model comes up against conceptual and theoretical problems
not encountered in alternative atomic models such as Thompson’s. One important
issue is that Rutherford’s model requires the existence of stable states that cannot
be determined based on classical electrodynamics. Furthermore, the quantities
present in the Rutherford model do not provide enough information to determine a
characteristic length for the radius of the atom. Bohr notes that the introduction of
h provides this information, since its units and dimensions make it possible to
calculate the length of the atom which turns out to be of the expected order of
magnitude based on other experiments. Thus, Bohr’s use of the quantum postulate
is directed towards providing a preliminary theory of the structure of the atom, in
contrast to the work on radiation that came before. However, his quantum
conjecture is again notably different from Planck’s, even though the fundamental
idea of quantization comes directly from Planck’s work.
In the first section of the paper, Bohr shows how applying assumptions found in
Planck’s theory of radiation to ideas on the atomic structure of hydrogen results in
an account of how electrons might be bound to a positive nucleus in stable states.
He first considers an atomic model in the style of Rutherford, consisting of a system
of a positively charged nucleus with an electron orbiting this nucleus. He describes
how a classical treatment of energy radiation by the electron would result in a
continuously shrinking orbit, with large, continuous quantities of emitted radiation,
such as are not observed in experiments. Here is where Bohr brings in assumptions
from Planck’s work, which he phrases as follows.
Now the essential point in Planck’s theory of radiation is that the energy
radiation from an atomic system does not take place in the continuous
11See Heilbron & Kuhn (1969) for a detailed treatment of this episode.
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way assumed in the ordinary electrodynamics, but that it, on the
contrary, takes place in distinctly separated emissions, the amount of
energy radiated out from an atomic vibrator of frequency ν in a single
emission being equal to τhν, where τ is an entire number, and h is a
universal constant. (Bohr, 1913, p. 4)
It is crucial that Bohr had to determine how he might apply something like
Planck’s quantum conjecture to an atomic system. In order to do so, he posited the
existence of stable states, with electrons orbiting the nucleus in definite orbits. He
initially considered the emission process from an atomic system as taking place in
quantized amounts, dependent on the parameter h. He assumed that the radiation
is monochromatic, and that the amount of energy emitted is equal to hν, where ν is
the frequency of the emitted radiation (p. 8). More importantly, Bohr then goes on
to show how a modification of this conjecture can be used to recover the same
results. Rather than assuming that the stationary states correspond to emissions of
integral quanta, Bohr assumes “that the frequency of the energy emitted during the
passing of the system from a state in which no energy is yet radiated out to one of
the different stationary states, is equal to different multiples of ω/2, where ω is the
frequency of revolution of the electron in the state considered” (p. 14). Thus, he
eliminates the reference to actual quanta of energy, and relates instead the
frequency of emitted radiation to the frequency of revolution of an electron in one of
the stable states. Bohr’s ultimate statement of his conjecture is the following.
If we therefore assume that the orbit of the electron in the stationary
states is circular, the result . . . can be expressed by the simple condition:
that the angular momentum of the electron round the nucleus in a
stationary state of the system is equal to an entire multiple of a universal
value, independent of the charge on the nucleus. (Bohr, 1913, p. 15)
Using this conjecture along with his elementary atomic model, Bohr was able to
account for the Balmer formula, which described the discrete spectral lines observed
when hydrogen gas is heated.12
Although Bohr explicitly references Planck’s quantization conjecture, Bohr’s
interpretation of quantization is a novel one. First, it is clearly the case that his
quantum conjecture differs from those of Planck and Einstein. Several quotes from
Bohr emphasize the fact that this application is different from what has come
before. For instance,
12I omit the details of Bohr’s numerical argument here, but they will be presented in Chapter 5.
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It is readily seen that there can be no question of a direct application of
Planck’s theory. This theory is concerned with the emission and
absorption of energy in a system of electrical particles, which oscillate
with a given frequency per second, dependent only on the nature of the
system and independent of the amount of energy contained in the
system. (Bohr, 1922, 10)
This is in contrast to an atomic system, where the frequency depends on the
energy of the system. Therefore, despite the reference to the emission of discrete
amounts of energy, this is not a straightforward application of Planck’s idea. This
difference is unsurprising. While quantum hypotheses raised in the context of
blackbody radiation and light quanta were dealing with thermodynamical
phenomena, and thus evaluating behaviour on a large scale, Bohr was using a
quantum hypothesis in the investigation of individual atomic structure. Unlike
Einstein’s conjecture of light quanta, Bohr does not hypothesize about the
constitution of electromagnetic radiation itself.
2.3 The general postulate
In the previous section, I emphasized the different quantum conjectures in use in
various domains of application. We have seen that these conjectures differed quite
widely in terms of the scientists’ intended scope, as well as their physical
underpinnings. Planck’s conjecture was one about the behaviour of radiation in its
interaction with ‘resonators’; Einstein hypothesized the existence of physical quanta
of light, as well as suggesting that the energy of an oscillator as a model of solid
matter could be quantized; Bohr’s conjecture was used to determine the stable
states of his atomic model of hydrogen. Despite these differences, it is clear that
there was some common idea that linked all of these applications. I submit that the
core assumption that we can infer from all of the quantum conjectures can be
articulated in the following way: “There is a universal, nonzero parameter h with
the dimensions of action that can be used to impose a quantization condition on
quantities that were previously considered to be continuous, in such a way that
reduces to the specific conjectures in each of the domains.” Each of the more
specific claims about radiation or physical systems can be seen as a particular
instance of quantization. I claim that scientists were implicitly seeking to find
support for the general postulate, as evidenced by their attempts to find more ways
26
to apply the idea to different systems despite disagreements or ambivalence about
the underlying physical mechanisms causing the quantized behaviour.
Such ambivalence can be observed in several contexts. I have already discussed
the varying ways in which we might understand Planck’s quantum conjecture. It
was not clear whether the quantization was meant to apply to the physical
resonators modeling a blackbody, or merely in a mathematical description of phase
space when calculating the entropy. Lorentz, for instance, said,
[W]e cannot say that the mechanism of the phenomena has been
unveiled [by Planck’s theory], and it must be admitted that it is difficult
to see the reason for this partition of energy by finite portions, which are
not even equal to each other, but vary from one resonator to the other.
(Lorentz 1909, quoted in Jammer 1966, 24)
Even Planck’s assumption of resonators was not meant to be a literal description
of the physical system; instead, he was relying on Kirchhoff’s law which states that
the radiation in blackbodies is dependent purely on temperature and not on their
specific material. Whether this was an appropriate model or not, the fact that
quantization was a crucial feature for the recovery of the distribution law for
blackbody radiation emerged quite clearly. Subsequent applications of quantization
can be seen as ways that scientists were exploring the possibility of a general
postulate that would still recover the distribution law.
We should also consider the fact that Einstein was likely not as committed to the
existence of physical light quanta as one might have assumed. Although in the first
part of his 1905 paper Einstein phrases the underlying assumption as one about light
quanta, his primary argument is about the behaviour of monochromatic low-density
radiation. Consider what Einstein writes to Lorentz in 1909: “As far as the light
quanta are concerned, it seems that I did not express myself clearly. For I am not at
all of the opinion that light has to be thought of as being composed of mutually
independent quanta localized in relatively small spaces” (Einstein 1909/1995, p.
123). This might seem quite surprising, but it likely reflects his recognition of the
fact that Maxwell’s equations for electromagnetic radiation were extremely well
confirmed in certain domains. Indeed, at the start of the paper, Einstein says that
“The wave theory of light which operates with continuous functions in space has
been excellently justified for the representation of purely optical phenomena and it
is unlikely ever to be replaced by another theory” (Einstein, 1905, 91). Thus, even
though he called his 1905 paper “revolutionary,” what he was committed to was the
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idea that a new concept of quantization would have to be incorporated in some
domain of description of the behaviour of light, and not necessarily to the physical
existence of the light quanta. This attitude is displayed in the final section of his
(1909), where he sketches a possible interpretation of the meaning of light quanta in
which the energy of the electromagnetic field is localized in singular points, and the
fields associated with each point superpose in such a way as to recover the wave
description of the field. However, he goes on to say, “I am sure it need not be
particularly emphasized that no importance should be attached to such a picture as
long as it has not led to an exact theory” (Einstein, 1909/1989, p. 394).13
Similar considerations are true for Bohr’s use of quantization. Despite his
discussion’s use of mechanical concepts such as the angular momentum of an
electron, he says that “there obviously can be no question of a mechanical
foundation of the calculations given in this paper” (Bohr, 1913, p. 15), indicating
that such links between the quantum conjecture and any physical accounts are
speculative at best. Bohr himself did not claim that his use of quantization
explained anything in a deep sense in his atomic model.
I am by no means trying to give what might ordinarily be described as
an explanation; nothing has been said here about how or why the
radiation is emitted. (Bohr, 1922, p. 13)
This is particularly apt given that Bohr never accepted Einstein’s light quanta
explanation. Instead, Bohr seems to treat his quantum conjecture as simply another
application of a general idea of quantization in the progression towards a theory
that includes the notion in a precise way.
2.4 Implications
The foregoing discussion underlies my claim that there was a process of piecemeal
pursuit that was occurring at this time: the applicability of the general postulate in
a variety of disparate contexts was providing support for the postulate despite the
absence of an overall theoretical framework in which the postulate could be
consistently embedded. One might object that simply ignoring certain aspects of
the quantum conjectures as originally presented might render the postulate so vague
that it is no longer useful as a promising idea. However, consider two points. First,
13Darrigol (2014) provides an excellent account of Einstein’s vacillating commitment to the idea
of light quanta and quantization in general in the decade after 1905.
28
in the context of pursuit, I would argue that it is quite realistic to be working with a
very indefinite postulate, since we lack a theory that precisely defines the entities
about which we are theorizing. Second, although the postulate is extremely
noncommital with respect to underlying causes, its inclusion of the specific
parameter h renders it precise enough to be useful for further pursuit. In this
section, I discuss these points and their implications for our understanding of theory
pursuit that this suggests.
First, we see how the existence of ‘piecemeal’ attempts to apply the idea of
quantization helped scientists to infer that something fundamental about previous
theories had to be changed. Any individual application of the idea of quantization
could be considered merely as a way of trying to recover the phenomenon in
question, and as we have seen, could be attributed to various possible physical
causes. Indeed, we can understand Planck’s original introduction of the idea in just
these terms. However, the increasingly broad applicability of the notion of
quantization in different domains began to eliminate the possibility that previous
continuous descriptions of quantities could be wholly accurate. After all, an
explanation of blackbody radiation in terms of some mechanism in a resonator’s
interaction with radiation could not be used in a straightforward way to quantize
the phase space of a harmonic oscillator being used to model a diamond. Thus, the
‘indefinite’ nature of the postulate is actually an indication of how universal it is,
and the universality of the general quantum postulate made it increasingly clear that
some fundamental aspect of previous descriptions of physical systems had to change.
This point can be considered more generally for any process of pursuit that is
similarly piecemeal in nature. In this particular example, I claim that the increasing
number of applications of the idea of quantization indicated that there was
something necessary about this description at a fundamental physical level.
However, I believe that even in cases where a previously accepted description of
fundamental processes is not being challenged, we can see that broad applicability
has a benefit beyond ‘fruitfulness,’ where this refers to the possibility of finding
additional applications. A methodology of pursuit that tries to identify principles
that are widely applicable and then seeks to apply them in as many settings as
possible is desirable not only because such a practice may allow scientists to come
upon a number of appropriate applications of the principle, and to explain more
phenomena. Rather, such a practice allows scientists to identify what is common
among these various applications in order to decide what should be retained in any
theory going forward. As the number of successful applications grows, we obtain
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more information about what a proper generalization should be, and which parts of
the principle are crucial in accounting for the phenomena. In our example, if the
application of quantization to the phenomenon of specific heats had failed, then it
would have been reasonable to think that the general postulate that was being
supported would make some reference to electromagnetic radiation; however, the
successful application in that context indicated that we should broaden our
perspective.
A crucial aspect of the general quantum postulate that I did not focus on in this
chapter was the importance of the inclusion of the theoretical parameter of Planck’s
constant. We saw that h, with its dimension of action, made it possible to quantize
the various systems and thus linked the different contexts. In the next chapters, I
will discuss in more detail how h both allowed for precise predictions that could be
tested, and also how its inclusion made the experimental observations yield
information about the quantum postulate by measuring the size of h. I claim that
any widely applicable principle must be tempered by some kind of specificity in
order to obtain good scientific results.
This combination of broad applicability and specificity is a desirable feature of a
principle in the context of pursuit. While my particular analysis identifies a
postulate that is applicable at a very fundamental physical level and where
specificity comes from a universal theoretical parameter, these features could very
well be interpreted differently in different contexts. It is possible that one way to
apply a principle very widely would be to find a physical mechanism that helps to
account for phenomena being studied in different domains. According to my
characterization, it would also be important for such a principle to have a level of
specificity, such that it could yield precise and testable predictions in a variety of
contexts. Even better would be the ability to use experimental results to infer
something about the nature of the principle under examination.
Finally, this study provides us with an example of how we can identify a
postulate as promising without its being embedded in a larger theoretical framework
that is deemed worthy of pursuit. A specific conjecture that seems promising in one
particular domain is generalised so that a broader postulate is applicable in a
variety of domains, and the nature of the postulate indicates that a new theory will
be forthcoming. Thus, we have a case where we have no full coherent framework,
but where a postulate can be identified from among a background framework and
deemed promising, and supported by the evidence.
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2.5 Conclusion
I have argued for my characterization of the applications of a general postulate
about quantization as a process of piecemeal pursuit. This is due to the fact that
the various quantum conjectures in use differed significantly in their interpretation
of what should be considered as quantized, and also in terms of their physical
explanations of the observed behaviour. The application of the general quantum
postulate in ever broader contexts indicated that it was indeed a universal principle,
and that scientists should be attempting to find an appropriate generalization of the
postulate in any developing theory. In the following chapters, I will discuss the
evidential relations between the experiments in each context and the general
quantum postulate.
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Chapter 3
The Photoelectric Effect
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I examine the way in which the phenomenon of the photoelectric
effect influenced and constrained an episode of theory pursuit. I will show how a
scientist need not be committed to all of the elements of a framework in order for
research to be guided by that framework, and that despite disagreements about
some of these elements, there can be agreement about certain aspects of the
framework based on experimental results.
Most people now take for granted the importance of Einstein’s explanation of
the photoelectric effect for the development of quantum theory. Yet, when Einstein
first provided a tentative explanation of the effect in 1905 by way of his light quanta
postulate, the reaction from the scientific community was quite skeptical. This was
because a hypothesis of localized light quanta did not seem as though it would be
able to account for the experimentally well-established diffraction phenomena,
which was explained by the wave theory of light. Despite various misgivings, great
strides in quantum theory were made from 1905 to 1921, as evidenced by Einstein’s
Nobel prize in the latter year.
Much of the support for Einstein’s ideas came from Millikan’s experiments on
the photoelectric effect, published in 1916. Yet, Millikan was one of many to
disagree with Einstein about what the underlying theory explaining the
photoelectric effect might be. This shows that when we consider the context of
pursuit, we should be careful about exactly what is being pursued, and what is
being confirmed. In this case, we should consider Millikan as pursuing a very specific
hypothesis about the relationship between two quantities in the experimental setup
of photoelectric phenomena, in order to confirm its accuracy. While scientists were
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perhaps trying to ultimately articulate a theory that could consistently and
accurately account for a growing body of experimental results, and that could also
recover the successes of classical theories, there was no theoretical framework that
could achieve all of these demands at the time of Millikan’s work. This chapter
provides a historical case study of how pursuit and confirmation of a particular
element of a framework can contribute to the articulation of such a theory.
I first provide a brief overview of Einstein’s argument for light quanta as it
relates to the photoelectric effect. In Section 3.3, I discuss Millikan’s experimental
results. I then provide an analysis of the significance of these results for
understanding the context of pursuit in Section 3.4. These arguments are significant
for my characterization of the process of pursuit, but this episode will also be
important for my later explications of support using a tempered personalist
framework. In Chapter 4, I will return to this example in order to explicate the
support that the quantum postulate gained through Einstein’s correct prediction of
a particular formula, and Chapter 6 will appeal to Millikan’s measurement of the
value of Planck’s constant.
3.2 Einstein and light quanta
We now understand the photoelectric effect as the emission of streams of electrons
from certain metallic surfaces that are charged to an electric potential when these
surfaces are exposed to incident ultraviolet light. This phenomenon was first
observed by Philipp Lenard in 1887, who conducted experiments on illuminated
metals and the resulting “cathode rays” that were emitted from those surfaces.
While Lenard was able to document various ways in which rays were emitted in
different circumstances, he had no ready explanation for the behaviour of these rays.
Contrary to the predictions of classical theory, the energy of the emitted rays was
independent of the intensity of the incident light, depending instead on its
frequency. Although this was a puzzling result, there did not seem to be a pressing
need for an explanation, since the experiments were not particularly precise, and
thus did not point definitively to a problem that had to be solved.1
The first link between any kind of quantum postulate and the photoelectric
effect was made by Einstein in 1905 when he initially put forth the possibility of the
existence of light quanta. As we saw in Chapter 2, the primary motivation for the
postulate arose in analogy with the kinetic theory of gases. After presenting his
1See Hendry (1980) for more details.
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analogical argument, Einstein gives a statement that perfectly accords with an
attitude of pursuit:
If monochromatic radiation — of sufficiently low density — behaves, as
far as the volume-dependence of its entropy is concerned, as a
discontinuous medium consisting of energy quanta of magnitude hν, it is
plausible to investigate whether the laws on creation and transformation
of light are also such as if light consisted of such energy quanta.2
(Einstein, 1905/1967, p. 102, emphasis added)
He then goes on to consider how this hypothesis might account for several
phenomena, including the observations of the photoelectric effect. For Einstein
among others, the observations of these phenomena pointed to the existence of
anomalies in classical theories. These anomalies suggested the necessity of
developing a new theory; a theory that treated energy discretely that could be
consistently applied over many domains. The problem that had to be solved was
that certain wave aspects of light were so well-established that no one was prepared
to give them up. Indeed, it was a reasonable constraint that any future theory
would have to account for diffraction phenomena as successfully as the wave theory.
At the same time, energy was displaying seemingly contradictory particle-like
behaviour in certain contexts. These facts needed to be reconciled in some way.
Thus, Einstein’s attitude here is that the idea he has put forth is a promising one
and should be pursued, perhaps to make progress in finding a more generally
applicable theory. He goes on to show how pursuing the idea he has put forth in the
context of the photoelectric effect could contribute to the articulation of such a
theory.
Einstein hypothesized that each light quantum penetrating the surface layer of
bodies has a definite amount of energy that is proportional to the frequency of the
light. Once a quantum has penetrated the surface, its energy might be transferred
to an electron in the substance. If the amount of transferred energy is sufficient, the
electron does a certain amount of work to escape the surface, where the amount of
work required is determined by the experimentally controlled potential difference
between the substance and its surroundings. Any additional energy is manifested as
the kinetic energy of the escaped electron. The energy of an electron escaping the
2I continue to replace β with the equivalent h/k for consistency of notation.
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surface could be described by the equation
1
2
mv2 = V · e = hν − p. (3.1)
V is the potential difference against which an escaping electron is just able to drive
itself before coming to rest, e is the charge of that electron, ν is the frequency of the
incident light, p is the work required for an electron to escape the surface
(characteristic to the substance), and h is Planck’s constant. This hypothesized
interaction allowed Einstein to derive a prediction for the relation between the
voltage (potential difference) and the frequency of light. Specifically, he predicted
that
V =
h
e
ν − p/e, (3.2)
or that the relationship between V and ν would be a linear one, and that the slope
of this line would take the value h/e.3
Due to the limited experimental precision of Lenard’s results, it was impossible
to know whether this relation was borne out by observation. While it was known
that the value of V increased with ν, there was not sufficient evidence to determine
whether the relation was linear as opposed to some other increasing relationship.
Einstein was able to show an agreement to an order of magnitude between his
prediction of the potential difference required to stop the emission of cathode rays
and Lenard’s experimental setup, but this was not nearly precise enough to conclude
that his equation must hold. Neverthless, this work did allow him to predict that
graphing the relation between the potential difference and the frequency of the
incident light would yield a straight line with slope h/e. This prediction was crucial
for identifying a possible direction along which pursuit might occur.
Early reactions to Einstein’s light quanta hypothesis were skeptical. Kuhn, for
instance, says about the 1905 paper, “As to the photoelectric and related effects,
little evidence was available” (1978, p. 221). Furthermore, consider the reaction
from several leading scientists in their bid for Einstein’s membership into the
Prussian Academy of Sciences in June 1913:
In sum, it can be said that among the important problems, which are so
abundant in modern physics, there is hardly one in which Einstein did
not take a position in a remarkable manner. That he might sometimes
3This is the equivalent of Einstein’s notation, which I have changed for consistency with
Millikan’s work.
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have overshot the target in his speculations, as for example in his light
quantum hypothesis, should not be counted against him too much.
(Planck et al., 1913/1995, p. 337–338)
There were, after all, experimentally well-grounded objections to the light
quanta hypothesis. For instance, Jammer discusses experiments performed by
Lummer and Gehrcke, which seemed to indicate that light quanta, if they existed,
would have an extension of over a metre (Jammer, 1966, p. 43). Millikan mentions
that such a hypothesis cannot account for observed interference phenomena
(Millikan, 1916, p. 355). Nevertheless, some scientists deemed Einstein’s treatment
of the photoelectric effect very promising, and general opinion changed significantly
in reaction to Millikan’s very precise experiments performed in 1914. Indeed,
Einstein was awarded the 1921 Nobel Prize in Physics not for his work on special or
general relativity, but for his work on quantum theory; in particular, his work on
specific heats and the photoelectric effect are cited. In the speech, Arrhenius says,
Einstein’s law of the photo-electrical effect has been extremely rigorously
tested by the American Millikan and his pupils and passed the test
brilliantly. Owing to these studies by Einstein the quantum theory has
been perfected to a high degree and an extensive literature grew up in
this field whereby the extraordinary value of this theory was proved.
Einstein’s law has become the basis of quantitative photo-chemistry in
the same way as Faraday’s law is the basis of electro-chemistry.
(Arrhenius, 1922/1967)
In the speech, Arrhenius does not distinguish between different quantum
conjectures, and presents Einstein’s explanation of various phenomena explicitly in
terms of light quanta. He makes it sound as though Millikan’s work provided solid
support for Einstein’s light quanta conjecture. However, I will argue that this is a
bit too simplistic a characterization of what Millikan achieved with his experiments,
and that although it is certainly the case that Einstein’s light quanta conjecture
successfully guided numerous investigations, it is still desirable in the context of
pursuit to be cognizant of which elements of a framework are genuinely being
supported by experiments.
36
3.3 Millikan’s experiment
While Einstein’s paper is couched in terms of light quanta, one can pursue the
general idea of light behaving in the way Einstein describes without being
committed to their existence. As part of my analysis here, I wish to draw special
attention to the fact that the purpose of Millikan’s 1916 paper was not to defend or
vindicate Einstein’s light quanta hypothesis: instead, it was to use experiments on
photoelectric phenomena to determine the value of h with as high a precision as
possible. This fact has been recognised by several historians of science, most
recently perhaps by Allan Franklin (2013) and Roger Stuewer (2014), and is a
significant facet of an account of the pursuit of a quantum theory. We will see that
Millikan’s determination of the value of h required several steps. One step in
particular provided almost conclusive proof that the relationship between V and ν
was exactly the linear relationship that Einstein had predicted in 1905.
Millikan outlines five experimentally verifiable relationships contained in
Einstein’s photoelectric equation, Equation 3.1. The most important ones for our
purposes are the following:
1. There is a linear relation between V and ν.
2.
dV
dν
, or the slope of the V -ν line is numerically equal to h/e.
3. At the critical frequency ν0 at which v = 0, p = hν0, i.e. that the intercept of
the V -ν line on the ν axis is the lowest frequency at which the metal in
question can be photoelectrically active. (1916, p. 356)
He first discusses previous experiments on the photoelectric effect. These were
both experimentally less reliable, and focused on a limited number of wavelengths,
such that it was impossible to draw confident conclusions about the relationships
between experimental values. In fact, several experiments attempting to determine
the numerical value of Planck’s constant disagreed about the correct value
(Franklin, 2013, p. 577). Millikan’s group developed an accurate way to measure
the photoelectric effect for a much larger range of wavelengths than was previously
possible. He conducted experiments on several photoelectric materials and reported
his results on the alkali metals sodium and lithium.
The determination of h proceeded as follows. First, experiments were performed
in order to determine the potential difference required to stop all photoelectric
emission for a particular frequency of light ν on a sodium metal surface. This was
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Figure 3.1: Graph from Millikan (1916), p. 373
repeated for several values of ν. This value was not measured directly: for any given
ν, different voltages were applied to the experimental apparatus, and the resulting
photocurrent was observed. Several of these observations yielded enough data to
graph a line of best fit, whose potential-difference intercept was then determined.
These intercept values were plotted on a V -ν graph in order to determine the
general type of relation, which turned out to be clearly linear, as demonstrated in
Figure 3.1.
Setting the slope of this line to h/e, and using his previously determined value
for e, Millikan was able to calculate a value for h, which was 6.56× 10−27.
It was necessary to conduct this part of the experiment in a non-perfect vacuum
as the observations had to be taken over a long period of time, and in the best
achievable vacuum the values of some observables changed drastically after a short
initial period. However, higher quality data could be obtained by taking a small
number of observations in the best achievable vacuum. Thus, Millikan then adjusted
the experiment so that he was able to take measurements for two different
frequencies of light in the highest attainable vacuum. Having already clearly
established the linear relationship between V and ν using several data points,
Millikan used this new data to determine the slope of the line in an alternative way.
The mean value from these observations yielded a value of h = 6.569× 10−27erg · sec
with an error of no more than .5 percent.
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He also reported on similar experiments performed on lithium metal which
yielded a mean value of h = 6.584× 10−27erg · sec (p. 376, typo corrected), with an
uncertainty as much as 1 percent. Finally, Millikan calculates the value of h using
the same method as Planck’s original calculation, but using more recent
experimental and theoretical values of the necessary variables since he estimates
that Planck’s original calculation contained an uncertainty of at least 8 percent.
This yielded a value of h = 6.57× 10−27erg · sec.
The above summary shows very clearly that Millikan’s main concern was the
confirmation of Einstein’s equation expressing the relation between frequency and
potential difference in the photoelectric effect, and the subsequent measurement of
h. This was not an experiment designed to test the light quanta hypothesis. He
characterizes the inquiry as one that would allow him to “assert whether or not
Planck’s h actually appeared in photoelectric phenomena as it has been usually
assumed for ten years to do” (Millikan, 1916, p. 360). He also discusses the work of
scientists such as Hughes, Richardson and Compton in terms of their determinations
of h. Thus, we can infer that in Millikan’s view, what scientists were really able to
take away from Einstein’s 1905 paper was the applicability of the parameter h to a
new domain based on Equation 3.1, which guided the research programs on the
photoelectric effect for the next decade.
3.4 Context of pursuit
This episode demonstrates several points relevant for the context of pursuit. First,
we have an example of the fact that the ability of a hypothesis to qualitatively
explain a phenomenon is not enough to constitute good evidence for that
hypothesis. If it were, Einstein’s first paper would have been taken to be a much
stronger argument, as it was able to provide a perfectly good explanation of the
photoelectric effect that was in accord with the best experiments of the time, along
with other observed phenomena such as Stokes’s Rule.
Stokes’s Rule . . . was well established. But, in the absence of a quantum
theory applicable to spectral frequencies, Einstein’s suggestion did little
to explain the phenomenon and offered no guidance at all for further
research. As to the photoelectric and related effects, little evidence was
available. (Kuhn, 1978, p. 221)
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Aside from the fact that there were elements of his light quantum hypothesis
that appeared to be in conflict with accepted wave theories of light, his work was
also lacking a certain level of experimental precision that would lend credibility to
his conjecture. Later, despite the fact that few if any of the earlier conflicts with
classical theories of light were resolved, Millikan’s far more precise determinations of
the value of h using photoelectric phenomena were striking.
This period also provides a clear example of how scientists might reasonably
disagree about the significance of certain anomalies with established theories, and
exhibits some of the different ways that they might proceed in the context of pursuit
to account for these anomalies. In 1916, Millikan was ready to accept Einstein’s
predicted linear relationship between V and ν. Yet, he still rejected the original
explanation for that equation, namely, the hypothesis of light quanta. Indeed, he
describes the hypothesis as “bold, not to say reckless,” and calls it “a form of
quantum theory which has now been pretty generally abandoned” (p. 355). In fact,
consider what Millikan says in his 1917 book, The Electron.
Despite then the apparently complete success of the Einstein equation,
the physical theory of which it was designed to be the symbolic
expression is found so untenable that Einstein himself, I believe, no
longer holds to it, and we are in the position of having built a very
perfect structure and then knocked out entirely the underpinning
without causing the building to fall. It stands complete and apparently
well tested, but without any visible means of support . . . Experiment has
outrun theory, or better, guided by erroneous theory, it has discovered
relationships which seem to be of the greatest interest and importance,
but the reasons for them are as yet not at all understood. (p. 230)
Given this attitude, it is reasonable that he would try to provide alternatives to
the light quanta conjecture that would still explain why this equation might be
physically instantiated. In the last section of his paper, Millikan provides such an
alternative.
He proposes that while a body may contain mostly oscillators of a characteristic
frequency, these may be mixed with a small number of oscillators of different
frequencies. These oscillators would absorb energy from light of their particular
frequency until their energy reaches some critical value. The emitted corpuscle may
then impact other oscillators, which may in turn emit corpuscles of their
characteristic amount of energy. Since the substance is composed largely of
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oscillators of this frequency, emitted corpuscles will overwhelmingly possess this
amount of energy. We see that Millikan’s suggestion bears a closer resemblance to
Planck’s quantum conjecture about quantized oscillator energy, and explicitly
distances itself from Einstein’s light quanta conjecture.
This suggestion made use of the idea of resonance, whereby some mechanism in
the atom is triggered by light of the appropriate frequency. In addition to its
relation to Planck’s conjecture, it was also related to earlier suggestions such as
Lenard’s, who had already speculated that it was just such a phenomenon that was
producing the photoelectric effect. Similarly, it appeared that such an explanation
would be able to account for the phenomenon of blackbody radiation.4 Johannes
Stark was an enthusiastic early proponent of the quantum theory, and appealed to
ideas about quantization from 1905 onward, but he was also considering some
physical process of the oscillators as being the underlying cause of quantization.
In my opinion it is not necessary to postulate a discontinuous structure
of the radiation energy, which flows with the velocity of light in ether;
rather there exists in the process considered, which is governed by the
elementary law, a specific type of action exerted by the electromagnetic
resonators. (Stark 1908, 768)
Like Planck’s view, such posits shifted the anomalous behaviour to the processes
of matter interacting with energy rather than light itself. After all, it seemed at the
time that diffraction phenomena could only be explained by the existing wave
theory of light, which was enormously successful in most domains. Of course,
Einstein was fully committed to certain aspects of the wave theory:
The wave theory of light which operates with continuous functions in
space has been excellently justified for the representation of purely
optical phenomena and it is unlikely ever to be replaced by another
theory. (Einstein, 1905/1967, p. 91)
However, he viewed the conflict between such a wave theory and the light quanta
postulate as a problem to be solved, rather than an insurmountable difficulty for
light quanta. After all, he is clear that these theories may be applicable in their own
domains.
4See Hendry (1980) for more details.
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One should, however, bear in mind that optical observations refer to
time averages and not to instantaneous values and notwithstanding the
complete experimental verification of the theory of diffraction, reflexion,
refraction, dispersion, and so on, it is quite conceivable that a theory of
light involving the use of continuous functions in space will lead to
contradictions with experience, if it is applied to the phenomena of the
creation and conversion of light. (Einstein, 1905/1967, p. 91–92)
Thus, Einstein recognises that these different theories seem to hold in their
limited domains, and that it should be possible to account for both diffraction and
the photoelectric effect. For instance, while he says that it has “not yet been
possible to formulate a mathematical theory of radiation that would do justice to
both the undulatory structure and the . . . inferred . . . quantum structure” of
radiation, (1909/1989, p. 394), we saw in Section 2.3 how he approached the
problem by considering some constraints on the formulation of such a theory. While
others were rejecting light quanta because it was inconsistent with classical ideas,
Einstein was urging the idea that the two conceptions were not inconsistent, and
says about his sketch, “All I wanted is briefly to indicate . . . that the two structural
properties (the undulatory structure and the quantum structure) simultaneously
displayed by radiation according to the Planck formula should not be considered as
mutually incompatible” (ibid).
This type of disagreement with respect to how theorizing should proceed is
unsurprising, as this is how new alternatives arise. Some scientists may be
committed to the older theories and seek to modify those; some others may suggest
completely new ideas. Regardless of these disagreements, there are ways in which
such lines of inquiry and subsequent research impose constraints that must be
satisfied in all further research. In our particular case, the experimental work that
arose from the photoelectric effect showed that Einstein’s Equation 3.1 was almost
certainly accurate. This result constrained the possible theories that were
subsequently developed.
As Millikan explains, the fact that Einstein’s equation holds shows that the
escaping electron must, at some point, absorb at least energy of amount hν. If one
does not want to accept Einstein’s light quanta hypothesis, the fact that electrons
are emitted immediately upon the surface’s illumination can only be explained by
assuming that corpuscles already possess that energy. This implies that there are
oscillators in the body ‘loading up’ to the value hν. Now, if these oscillators lost
energy whenever they are not exposed to radiation, they would eventually lose
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enough energy such that they would require hours of illumination to display
photoelectric effect. This is shown not to be the case by experiment. Therefore,
they cannot lose energy while not being illuminated, or, in other words, we must
assume a “discontinuous or explosive emission of the energy absorbed by the
electronic constituents of atoms” (Millikan, 1916, p. 385). Thus, Millikan agrees
that the confirmation of Einstein’s equation sets a constraint on any subsequent
theory that oscillators must show such a discrete, ‘explosive’ emission.5
The foregoing discussion shows very clearly that one need not be committed to
all of the elements of a suggested theory or framework in order for research to be
guided by that framework. Instead, scientists might agree that there is a general
idea that is promising, but have distinct opinions on what should be considered
crucial elements that must be included in that framework. Although this work is
now retrospectively taken to be good evidence for the photon theory of light,6 at the
time, Millikan characterized his work not as supporting Einstein’s photon theory,
but merely as confirming Einstein’s equation. It would be a misrepresentation of the
situation to claim that at the time the experiment was conducted, the hypothesis of
light quanta was clearly vindicated since, even then, virtually no scientists were
ready to declare this an acceptable theory. However, this work was considered good
evidence for the importance of incorporating h into the description of the behaviour
of energy in this domain. Thus, even in cases of high predictive accuracy, it is
natural to separate a confirmation of an equation or determination of a theoretical
parameter from the confirmation of all of the elements of the framework guiding the
research.
It is also worth mentioning that while such different attitudes in the context of
pursuit are all rational, they will clearly not all lead to an ultimately correct theory.
For instance, Stark attempted to use quantum theory to explain the Doppler effect
of canal rays, incorporating h into an account of the excitation of electrons by ions.
Stark did not at first subscribe to the idea of energy quanta per se, but rather some
5This argument is similar in structure to those given by Ehrenfest and Poincare´, explicated in
Norton (1993), in which an inference is made from experimental results to a conclusion about
discontinuity. It is perhaps the case that Millikan did not know of these arguments. Whether this
is the case or not, it is telling that Jeans, in his Report on Radiation Theory 1924, reported these
arguments, and yet still thought it was worthwhile to give other empirical arguments for a
quantum postulate, which we will see in greater detail in Chapter 6.
6Franklin (2013) outlines some of the textbook discussions of Millikan’s experiment, as well as
Millikan’s own later work; many of these tend to treat this experiment as excellent evidence for the
hypothesis of light quanta.
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kind of process attributable to the resonators being used to describe the process.
This attempt was ultimately unsuccessful. We now know that Millikan’s suggestion
of modifying Planck’s theory of radiation would also not be successful. However,
such varied approaches to the development of a new theory are reasonable and
important.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have discussed the way in which the light quanta conjecture
guided research on the photoelectric effect, despite scientists’ disagreements about
the significance of the conjecture itself. I showed that while the results forced
agreement about certain aspects of a future theory, this did not require the
acceptance of all the elements of the framework in which the phenomenon was being
investigated. This demonstrates more generally the possibility of using hypotheses
to guide research while coming up with different possibilities to explain the results
in the context of pursuit.
In the chapters to come, I will be appealing to this example again to explicate
support for the general quantum postulate in a Bayesian framework. This will
include discussion of Einstein’s precise prediction of Equation 3.2, and Millikan’s
measurement of h. These analyses will help clarify my claim that the inclusion of
Planck’s constant in the quantum postulate was crucial for the support the
postulate received.
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Chapter 4
Blackbody Radiation,
Inconsistency, and Tempered
Personalism
4.1 Introduction
In Chapters 2 and 3, I argued for the characterization of theory pursuit in the early
stages of quantum theory as a piecemeal process, and showed how scientists need
not be committed to particular conjectures in order to guide research and further
develop theories. In this chapter, I will discuss the origin of Planck’s original
quantum conjecture, and introduce the Bayesian framework in which I will be
evaluating the evidential relations in subsequent chapters. These analyses will show
how a formal framework can be used to interpret the epistemic force of the features
in question.
Section 4.2 is an examination of the genesis of the idea of quantization in
Planck’s treatment of blackbody radiation. I draw attention to the criticisms made
by Einstein and Jeans of Planck’s work, and I claim that previous philosophical
discussions have not paid close enough attention to the nature of these criticisms:
while there was of course a conceptual problem of combining classical principles
with a quantum hypothesis, Einstein’s criticism does not attribute an outright
contradiction to these claims, and Jeans’s criticism focused on empirically motivated
considerations. I argue that a historically influenced reconstruction of the
arguments for quantization must be able to account for this, and that a Bayesian
tempered personalist framework is well-suited to this task. In Section 4.3, I lay out
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the framework that I will be utilizing and suggest that we should understand
contradictory statements simply as statements that are being applied to a more
limited domain. I will discuss the idea of setting a prior for the quantum postulate
at the time of Planck’s introduction of the idea of quantization. Finally, I will
provide an example of how the general quantum postulate was supported by
Millikan’s experiments on the photoelectric effect as discussed in the previous
chapter.
4.2 Inconsistency and Blackbody Radiation
I focus here on the criticisms of the original presentation of the quantum postulate
in order to examine the way inconsistency was addressed when it first appeared. I
argue that the nature of the criticisms had an empirical aspect as well as a
conceptual one, and that this has often been overlooked by previous philosophical
discussions of Planck’s theory. These facts provide some guidance in terms of how
we can reconstruct the process of pursuit.
In Chapter 2, we saw that in 1900, Planck proposed a formula for the emission
spectrum of blackbody radiation that provided the correct values for all
experimental observations of the spectrum of frequencies at various temperatures.
Unfortunately, Einstein pointed out that certain of Planck’s assumptions in the
derivation of this formula were questionable in terms of their consistency (Einstein,
1906/1989). This fact is now well-known, and many discussions take for granted
that there is a fundamental inconsistency in Planck’s assumptions. Yet few
philosophical treatments address Einstein’s actual criticism.
I will argue that in keeping with Einstein’s analysis, it is possible to read
Planck’s assumptions in a way that are not actually inconsistent. I will also argue
that the main concern about Planck’s introduction of quantization for scientists
such as Einstein and Jeans was less the oft-cited conceptual problem of attributing
conflicting properties to resonators, but the fact that such assumptions required
some kind of independent motivation, or that they actually led to predictions that
were not borne out by observations. I begin by presenting Planck’s argument of
1901 and follow this with a discussion of the criticisms of this argument given by
Einstein and Jeans and some implications thereof.
We have already seen that Planck had to infer the form of the radiation law for
blackbodies based on two equations of limited validity, and provide a theoretical
interpretation of such a law only afterward. In his treatment of the radiation, he
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calculates restrictions on the equilibrium entropy of a blackbody at a particular
temperature in two different ways, then compares the two forms to obtain a more
precise expression of the entropy. Subsequent rearrangement yields the energy
distribution law sought for, Equation 2.1. The purported inconsistency arises from
the two different ways of restricting the entropy expression.
In the first restriction, Planck calculates how entropy would be expressed based
on the idea that the energy is divided into parts. To do this, he considers a large
number N of identical resonators of frequency ν. He takes the total entropy SN to
be k logW + constant. He proceeds to find the probability W so that the N
resonators possess vibrational energy UN . Crucially, he makes the assumption that
UN can be considered as a collection of P elements of energy of size , where the size
of  is not yet determined. The number of ways to divide the P elements between N
resonators is given by
W =
(N + P − 1)!
P !(N − 1)! , (4.1)
which, by ignoring the 1’s in relation to large N ’s and P ’s and applying
Stirling’s formula, can be approximated as
W =
(N + P )N+P
P PNN
. (4.2)
If entropy is S = k logW , then
SN = k [(N + P ) log(N + P )− P logP −N logN ] . (4.3)
However, the total entropy SN is just the entropy of a single resonator S, times
the number of resonators N . Furthermore, the total energy of the resonators, UN is
equal to P, the number of energy elements times the amount of energy in each
element, and UN is also equal to NU , where U is the average energy of a resonator.
Thus, P/N is equivalent to U/, and Equation 4.3 can be rewritten as
S = k
[(
U

+ 1
)
log
(
U

+ 1
)
− U

log
U

]
. (4.4)
This gives us the first restriction on the entropy of a resonator in terms of its
energy U .
In the second restriction on entropy, Planck refers back to earlier work in which
he calculated the relation between radiation density uν and the average energy of a
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resonator U ,
uν =
8piν2
c3
U. (4.5)
He did this by using classical theory to determine the expressions for the
absorption and emission of energy respectively, and equating them to obtain the
relation that holds at the equilibrium state. To be more precise, Planck used his
relation between a resonator’s absorbed energy and the intensity of the incident
radiation to calculate the relation between the average energy of a resonator and the
intensity of a monochromatic polarized ray K. With this relation between K and U ,
along with the Kirchhoff-Clausius law, one obtains a restriction on the form of uν .
Planck then uses this information to derive a form of Wien’s Displacement Law,
S = f(U
ν
), which can be seen as a restriction on the form of any expression for
entropy in the equilibrium state. Planck applies this to his earlier expression of
entropy to obtain the fact that the energy element  must be proportional to ν.
This gives the following expression for the entropy of a resonator.
S = k
[(
1 +
U
hν
)
log
(
1 +
U
hν
)
− U
hν
log
U
hν
]
(4.6)
Here, h and k are universal constants. By differentiating Equation 4.6 by U , we
obtain,
dS
dU
=
k
hν
log
(
hν
U
+ 1
)
. (4.7)
Setting the result equal to 1/T yields
U =
hν
ehν/kT − 1 , (4.8)
and substituting Equation 4.5, we obtain the final energy density formula,
Equation 2.1,
u =
8pihν3
c3
1
ehν/kT − 1 .
The inconsistency arises from the two different ways of calculating the
equilibrium entropy. As we have seen, the former case assumes that the energy of
the resonator takes on integral multiples of an undetermined amount . In the latter
case, the relation between u and E was one that Planck had previously calculated
based on Maxwell’s theory of electromagnetism, which, in Einstein’s words, “does
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not recognise distinguished energy values of a resonator” (Einstein, 1906/1989, p.
196). That is, in calculating the mean rate of absorption of energy by a resonator,
the values representing the change in energy of the resonator are expressions of
periodic functions that do not restrict their possible values to discrete ones. This is
the case because the expression of the force acting to change the state of the
resonator is modelled as a gradual process, which is necessary in order for the
Newtonian equations of motion to hold so that acceleration is well defined at every
moment. Therefore, the latter formulas assume that the resonators absorb radiation
continuously.1
One reason we might be concerned about this is that in these assumptions, we
have two statements that seem to contradict each other, namely, “Resonators
absorb radiation continuously,” and “Resonators absorb radiation in discrete
amounts.” This is enough to render any result unsound, insofar as we can derive
anything from such a contradiction. This is generally how the inconsistency is
described in the literature as well. Consider, for instance, the following descriptions.
The inconsistency arises from the fact that in deriving [the radiation
equation] theorists on the one hand appealed to a quantum postulate,
according to which the energy levels of the ‘resonators’, or ‘radiation
oscillators’ that give rise to the blackbody radiation, are quantized, but
on the other hand they appealed to results drawn from classical
electrodynamics, according to which these energy levels can vary
continuously. (Saatsi, 2014, p. 2951)
In his work on black-body radiation, Planck combined a quantum
hypothesis with classical electrodynamics, and came up with the first
theoretical derivation of the empirical black-body law. Of course the
quantum hypothesis was inconsistent with classical electrodynamics, and
as Poincarre´ [sic] acerbically pointed out, we can derive anything we
want from a contradiction. (Brown, 2014, p. 3093)
Yet this explication does not fully capture the reaction of either Einstein or Jeans,
although both criticized the tension between the assumptions in subsequent work.
As explained above, the fact that Maxwell’s equations are used to calculate the
mean energy of a resonator requires that the energy of the resonators varies
1My exposition of the problem follows Jeans’s presentation of calculating the energy of a
resonator and subsequent explanation.
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continuously, and yields a particular value for the mean energy. However, this is not
equivalent to saying that the only way that a resonator could possess this mean
energy value is to behave specifically in this continuous manner. This is, in fact,
consistent with the idea that resonators behave in such a way that there are discrete
jumps between energy levels, but that the mean energy nevertheless has the value
described by the continuous process. Planck seems to take into account such a
possibility as well, when he says,
It is true that this inconsistency is greatly reduced by the fact that, in
reality, only mean values of energy are taken from classical
electrodynamics, while, for the statistical calculation, the real values are
used. (Planck, 1913/1914, p. viii)
Of course, this raises the question of why such discrete resonators would behave
in such a way. Indeed, this seems to be how Einstein addresses the flaw in Planck’s
reasoning. He starts by saying that, in Planck’s theory, “[The underlying
assumption is that] although Maxwell’s theory is not applicable to elementary
resonators, nevertheless the mean energy of an elementary resonator in a radiation
space is equal to the energy calculated by means of Maxwell’s theory of electricity”
(Einstein, 1906/1989, p. 196, emphasis in original). He then goes on to explain why
this would be puzzling.
This proposition would be immediately plausible if, in all those parts of
the spectrum that are relevant for observation,  = (R/N)βν were small
compared with the mean energy E¯ν of a resonator; however, this is not
at all the case, for within the range of validity of Wien’s radiation
formula, eβν/T is large compared with 1. It is easy to prove that
according to Planck’s theory of radiation, within the range of validity of
Wien’s radiation formula, E¯ν/ has the value e
−βν/T , thus, E¯ν is much
smaller than . Therefore only a few resonators have energies different
from zero. (p. 196)
The criticism here appears to be that there is no reason to expect that the use of
Maxwell’s equations in such circumstances would yield the correct value for the
average energy, and so it is in fact surprising that it does. After all, if the energy
elements were small compared to the mean energy, it would be reasonable for
calculations of the integrals to ‘smooth out’ so to speak, but we are instead applying
the technique to values that are either zero, or quite large. Thus, Einstein seems to
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be drawing attention not to an impossibility, but to what might be seen as a strange
coincidence that calls out for further investigation. In fact, Einstein does not even
assign a conceptual incompatibility to the properties of resonators in this part of the
argument. Nor does he think that such an assignment of properties allows us to
derive any result whatsoever. On the contrary, the criticism is intended to show
that Planck was implicitly assuming the existence of something like light quanta.
The motivation behind this claim is to motivate the attempt to obtain the
derivation in a way that does not use this problematic assumption.
Although Jeans seems to take the more standard view that Planck was
attributing conflicting properties to the blackbody resonators, his criticism of
Planck’s radiation theory does not centre on the existence of inconsistent
assumptions, but instead identifies how such contrary assumptions result in
incorrect predictions. He says, “[Planck’s method] is open to serious objections. For,
in considering the partition of energy between the various resonators, it is assumed
that the energy can only vary by jumps of amount , while, in considering the
partition of energy between resonators and ether, it has to be assumed . . . that the
energy of the resonators can vary continuously” (Jeans, 1924, p. 21). He then goes
on to explain that this is problematic because if this were the case, we would expect
the resonators themselves to conform to Planck’s radiation formula, whereas the
resonators interacting with the containing medium would tend towards the
equipartition formula of classical mechanics.
The result would be a compromise between the two laws. Worse than
this, it would be a compromise which would depend on the relative
numbers of Planck resonators and of free electrons, and as the ratio of
these would vary from one substance to another, there would be no
definite law of radiation — the same for all substances — such as is
demanded by observation. (Jeans, 1924, p. 22)
Thus, according to Jeans, the problem with these assumptions is not merely the
conceptual incompatibility of assigning the resonators conflicting properties, but
also that doing so leads to a contradiction with an experimentally well-established
principle, Kirchhoff’s Law. While Jeans focuses on the empirical implications for
the system, Einstein highlights the implications for individual Planck resonators.
However, both are clearly examples that make specific inferences from the
inconsistency to characterize the problem.
As I have mentioned, previous philosophical discussions of this inconsistency,
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while insightful, have tended to focus on the conceptual inconsistency rather than
the more empirical criticisms. Most characterizations of Planck’s work identify the
problem as the fact that Planck assigned the resonators conflicting properties, or
that the quantization assumption conflicts with certain tenets of classical mechanics,
thus yielding a contradiction in the form of (H&¬H). For instance, Badino says,
“Thus, the two ways of calculating the energy of the oscillator rested upon
contradictory assumptions: classical continuous emission/absorption of energy in
the first case, discrete elements in the second” (2012, p. A29). This is the case even
in the “content-driven” discussions that are concerned with the actual progression
of scientific arguments.2 While it is true that Einstein and Jeans both noticed this
conceptual tension, I believe it is valuable to consider the further arguments they
give. We have seen that Einstein’s criticism calls into question whether there was
indeed a genuine inconsistency, and that Jeans’s discussion highlights the
importance of empirical results, even in cases with a purported inconsistency. It is
interesting to note that while both scientists criticize the assumptions being used,
they also both have very specific predictions that these contrary assumptions would
entail. This seems to give lie to the idea that from an inconsistent theory, one can
derive absolutely anything. After all, as Vickers (2014) notes, “just because one can
derive anything and everything with deductive logic doesn’t mean that there is a
danger one will” (p. 2900). Of course, several people have noticed this and there are
various methods for dealing with inconsistent science. I suggest that a
reconstruction of the investigations here should be able to account for the way in
which scientists such as Einstein and Jeans engaged with the quantum postulate.
This will require being very careful about what the domain of applicability is for
any given assumption, and a philosophical analysis should be able to take this into
account. This means we can make good use of a framework in which we identify the
background assumptions being used in order to make testable predictions in
conjunction with the postulate itself.
4.3 Tempered Personalism
I now turn to providing a basis for a formal analysis of the promise of QP. In order
to do so, we should consider how we might deal with the inconsistency in our
reconstruction.
2See Saatsi (2014) for a discussion of content-driven approaches to reconstructions of scientific
arguments.
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Philosophers have responded to the problem of inconsistency in several ways.
While some have focused on developing sophisticated logical tools such as systems
of paraconsistent logic that will tolerate contradictions, I take my project to be
more in line with what Saatsi (2014) calls the ‘content-driven perspective,’ in which
empirical success is analysed not in terms of logical tools, but by looking at the
inferences we can make in particular cases. Saatsi and Norton (1987) are among
those who take this approach. This is so even though I am situating my discussion
in the framework of Bayesian epistemology.
A traditional Bayesian framework is committed to the idea that agents do not
simply accept or reject statements, but that we have varying degrees of belief.
Bayesians are then able to make use of the probability calculus to model degrees of
belief in particular statements and combinations thereof, with rules governing the
transition from a ‘prior’ degree of belief to a ‘posterior’ when new information is
learned. A Bayesian framework is particularly apt because when we are considering
evidence for a hypothesis, a probabilistic framework provides a useful language for
expressing varying levels of promise. To quote Joyce, “since the data we receive is
often incomplete, imprecise or equivocal, the epistemically right response is often to
have opinions that are similarly incomplete, imprecise or equivocal” (Joyce, 2010, p.
283). This seems to me to express exactly the attitude a scientist should have in
this context: in the face of new evidence that is not definitive in settling a particular
question, the proper epistemic attitude is to allow for a range of possibilities when
evaluating the probability of a hypothesis. In what follows, I will make use of
‘imprecise credences,’ as defended in Joyce (2010). I first present the basics of the
framework as given, then comment on their interpretation in the context of pursuit.
1. A believer’s overall credal state can be represented by a family C of credence
functions defined on some Boolean algebra Ω. Facts about the person’s
opinions correspond to properties common to all the credence functions in her
credal state.
2. If the believer is rational then every credence function in C is a probability, so
∀c ∈ C, 0 ≤ c ≤ 1.
3. If a person in credal state C learns that some event D obtains (and nothing
else), then her post-learning state will be
CD = {c(·|D) = c(X)[c(D|X)/c(D)] : c ∈ C}.
4. A rational decision maker with credal state C is obliged to prefer one action A
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to another A when A’s expected utility exceeds that of A relative to every
credence function in C. (p. 287)
The elements of C are probability functions that are compatible with given
background information. I take a credal state to represent the doxastic state of an
agent with the relevant background information. The same considerations that
motivate the use of imprecise credences in general epistemology come to bear in the
context of scientific pursuit. When new information is learned, all credence
functions in C are updated accordingly, and new facts may emerge if all the
updated credence functions agree on a certain property. For instance, if every
member of C assigns X a greater degree of probability than Y , the agent can be
said to have a higher credence in X than in Y .
One might consider this a subjectivist model in the sense that I do not claim
that there is a unique credal state that all rational agents share. While imprecision
expresses the idea that an individual agent does not have a sharp credence about
particular statements, there also exist differences in overall credal states of different
agents. However, the general attitude with which I approach this framework is
influenced by ‘tempered personalism,’ a term first introduced by Shimony in order
to characterize the use of Bayesian tools to describe scientific investigations. This
approach requires that the framework be applied locally, and prescribes an
open-mindedness that sets the prior of any seriously proposed hypothesis high
enough such that it may be preferred to its rivals after sufficient evidence (Shimony,
1970, p. 101).
This approach has the desirable feature of being local in an important way.
When I say local, I refer to the idea that the evaluation of a hypothesis or theory
should be conducted within bounds that are largely specified by the domain of
inquiry. This was how Shimony pictured the framework being used in the context of
scientific inference, the idea being that “the individual investigation delimits an area
in which probabilities are calculated” (1970, p. 99). Many others have also
expressed the importance of considering evidence in local contexts rather than
trying to determine the support for a hypothesis using a background of global
knowledge. For instance, Brown (2014) says,
I believe it is methodologically preferable to follow the more detailed and
constrained programs of investigation that our best local accounts
suggest and see where they lead. So long as we recognize the tensions
between different programs of research and follow up thoroughly when
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new results suggest a possibility of reconciliation, we do best to continue
to develop and extend our best local understandings of the evidence in
each area. (p. 3089)
I believe this is an accurate way to capture the reasoning being utilized at the
time if we attend to the discussion of Planck’s inconsistency given above.
There, I emphasized that the problem scientists had with Planck’s derivation of
the radiation equation was not primarily that it contained a conceptual
contradiction. Even if they did think that this was the case, no one thought they
could derive absolutely anything from this set of assumptions. Instead, Einstein and
Jeans were both concerned that they could derive a specific result that was
undesirable or contrary to observations. One might be concerned that regardless of
the nature of the criticisms, it is unclear how to apply a traditional Bayesian
analysis due to the contradiction. However, I think it instead points to restrictions
in how we should apply the framework; namely, it points to the fact that it is a
mistake to think we must use the tools of Bayesian epistemology only to represent
all thought processes of an omniscient agent. Instead, it should be used as a tool in
localized contexts, just as suggested in the tempered personalist account. Before I
turn to this analysis, let us consider a related issue of inconsistency that has also
been discussed extensively, namely that found in Bohr’s first atomic model.
One might think that the assumptions Bohr used in his first atomic theory were
conceptually inconsistent. However, we must consider the fact that he was able to
derive a prediction that could actually be compared with experimental results. We
can model our own account of what goes on in our evaluation of all the phenomena
on Bohr’s suggestions: the ‘inconsistency’ is not one that went unnoticed in his case,
yet it was possible to make certain predictions about spectral phenomena that were
so precise, people took the results extremely seriously. While this result will be
discussed in greater detail below, I will point out here that although Bohr uses
classical mechanics to describe the motion of electrons within a system, he also
specifically posited that those equations of motion were applicable only in stable
states, and that such stable states existed. Thus, assumptions that might seem
contradictory should actually be understood as applications of classical principles
that were well-known to hold in certain domains to a new but limited domain.
The above considerations lead me to posit that we should consider each of the
judgments prescribed by the Bayesian framework as being made over a restricted set
of background knowledge, where logical omniscience does not hold. We identify the
relevant set of background knowledge for each judgment by examining the domain
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of applicability in question. In most cases, a domain will be explicitly limited by the
assumptions in the background information. Furthermore, the background
information in each case is information that is accepted in the investigation being
considered for the purposes of making a judgment. This does not mean that the
contents of this background information can never be questioned in the future;
simply that it constitutes accepted information in the context at hand. We will see
that often, the content of the background knowledge is justified in ways that make
the information plausible to the majority of scientists, and so serve well as shared
assumptions in a given context.
4.4 Analysis
One might be concerned about how to determine a reasonable prior for Planck’s
quantum conjecture when it is first introduced. Because the conjecture, which I will
here abbreviate QC, came about in response to a particular experimental problem, I
will first address the issue of setting a prior for QC before these experimental results
were known, and then consider the impact of these results on this value.
An obvious problem with setting an intial prior value for P (QC) arises from the
fact that such a conjecture seems to contradict important tenets of classical physics,
i.e. that energy is continuous and wavelike. This could be problematic for two
reasons. First, the degree of belief one should have in a statement that directly
contradicts your background information should be 0. Second, the combination of a
quantum postulate and classical physics might seem to contain a contradiction from
which any statement can be derived, thus making the prior degree of belief for any
evidence conditional on that background 1, rendering all possible evidence equally
confirmatory.
However, we have already seen how these are not problematic in the framework
we are using, mainly for reasons of appropriately limiting the content of B, our
background knowledge. For one thing, doing so allows us to be explicit about why a
quantum conjecture does not directly contradict information in B. Moreover, we
can see how identifying what is included in B allows us to limit classical theories
from being all-encompassing. For instance, relevant information to be included in B
might be a statement such as, “In almost every physical domain studied thus far, the
behaviour of energy has been accurately described by Maxwell’s equations. These
equations imply that energy behaves like a wave.” It is true that any subsequent
theory that is developed will have to be able to account for this behaviour, and it is
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thus prima facie unlikely that a postulate that energy behaves as a particle will be
able to do so. However, this does not altogether preclude the possibility of such a
postulate, especially in contexts where classical theories have been known to fail,
and these are exactly the contexts in which quantization was being investigated.
More importantly, this is precisely the kind of attitude that tempered personalism
requires, such that a seriously suggested hypothesis may overcome others in light of
sufficient data. In the framework of imprecise credences, this means that it must be
possible for an agent’s credal state to be such that all members of C will eventually
assign the hypothesis a higher degree of probability than any other hypotheses.
The above discussion provides reasons for why the initial prior for Planck’s QC
should not be 0. Nevertheless, this value is still not very high. What is more
relevant for our purposes is a consideration of the value of P (QC) in relation to the
experimental results on blackbody radiation, and an articulation of B that allows us
to consider a change in P (QC) once Planck introduced this conjecture in this
context. I claim that this is the relevant point at which to consider P (QC).
Although scientists would not have considered a quantum conjecture before these
experiments, I have already argued that a prior value for P (QC) would be very low,
and we must consider instead how these experimental results made scientists take
the idea of QC seriously. In other words, how would an agent update a belief in QC
after these results were known.
I will turn to a determination of what needs to be included in background
knowledge B in order to make a judgment about the value of P (QC), where QC is
Planck’s initial quantum conjecture. That is, we should determine what
assumptions were necessary for the evaluation of this conjecture, and to try to
properly delimit the domain to which the assumptions apply. Planck’s quantum
conjecture can be phrased in the following way: “In the context of blackbody
radiation, resonator energies must be considered in terms of discrete packets of size
hν, where ν is the frequency of incident radiation, and h is a nonzero constant.” We
need enough information in B so as to be able to relate Planck’s quantum conjecture
to evidence E, the formula for the energy density uν of blackbody radiation.
Some tenets of classical physics must be included. This is because QC, in
conjunction with some of these results, is how we derive the result uν .
1. Kirchhoff’s Law, which states that the radiation in blackbodies is dependent
purely on temperature and not on their specific material.
2. The mean energy of a resonator is the value calculated through classical
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means.
3. Stefan-Boltzmann Law, u = σT 4.
4. Wien’s displacement law, which relates the wavelength of the maximum
density of emitted radiation in a blackbody to its temperature.
Recall that these assumptions, in conjunction with the QC, allows Planck to
derive the empirically correct radiation formula. Thus, the claim is that QC is
supported by the particular distribution formula for radiation because it, in
conjunction with these elements of background information, make it possible to
derive the formula for uν . I claim that the above principles are legitimately included
in B, and accepted for the purposes of this investigation, primarily due to their
phenomenological character, that is, because they had been inferred directly from
experimental results. This previous confirmation of these laws is what made them
acceptable in this context, without having to reference their derivability from more
basic assumptions about the nature of energy. This emphasis on experimentally
confirmed results is clearly reflected in the literature on blackbody radiation.
This analysis differs from John Norton’s as given in his 1987 paper, in which he
argues that there is a subtheory of Planck’s derivation that recovers the radiation
equation and eliminates the inconsistency on the nature of resonators. He shows
that from certain posited properties of radiation, one can derive the essential
classical results listed above and from these, one can then derive Planck’s radiation
equation. While this is an extremely interesting and important result, my goal is to
show that the tempered personalist framework can explicate the reasoning in a way
that is closer to that which was operative at the time, which is why I have claimed
that the laws I have cited should be considered a part of the background B for a
rational agent.
One might object that even the inclusion of these classical laws in B implies
some commitment to the idea of energy continuity since they were developed in this
theoretical framework. However, I would argue that this includes far too much in
terms of commitments to other elements of the classical framework. After all, we
might say that fluid behaviour is accurately described by differential equations,
which only apply to continuous quantities. Yet this does not mean that one need be
fundamentally committed to the continuity of the fluid in question. Instead, one
might accept that such a theory very accurately describes fluid behaviour at a
certain lengthscale, and that one is justified in using it in certain domains.
Analogously, one can accept that Maxwell’s equations accurately describe mean
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energy values — even in all of the contexts so far observed — without being
committed to the idea that the energy must literally be continuous at all possible
lengthscales, let alone that such assumptions are required for a phenomenological
description of observed patterns of radiation distribution. In fact, Planck says
something very similar.
Without committing myself too much to details, I may still note the
following: in hydrodynamics and in the theory of elasticity, matter will
almost always be assumed as arranged continuously in space, and no one
finds in these considerations . . . a contradiction with the generally
accepted atomic structure of bodies. . . . I am well aware that this
analogy is by no means complete, but it can hardly be entirely
dismissed. (quoted in Gearhart, 2002, p. 201–202)
The tempered personalist framework makes explicit how we can include a very
limited set of assumptions in an investigation, so long as there is some good reason
to accept them in that context.
If one then considers Planck’s quantum conjecture on a background that
includes the ideas given above, one can derive the distribution formula for
blackbody radiation, which is confirmed by Lummer & Pringsheim’s experimental
results. Thus, some (though certainly not all) of the credence functions in C will
change so that QC becomes more likely than its negation. Because of this shift in
credence functions, the resulting credal state will no longer unequivocally say that a
classical view of energy is more likely than a theory that included QC. Thus, an
appropriate epistemic response at the time of Planck’s introduction of his conjecture
would be to have a less precise credence about QC, but in a way that makes it
reasonable to pursue a theory using this result as a guide for further research.
I have been focusing on Planck’s specific quantum conjecture, and I have not yet
claimed that this result provides support for the general quantum postulate, QP .
This is because in the context being considered, there was not as yet a strong reason
to think that a more fundamental amendment to principles of classical physics
would be required. The results on blackbody radiation provides the universal QP a
bit of support, since it demonstrates one context where the idea of quantization is
able to solve a problem. However, it might very well have been the case that the
specific conjecture could have been incorporated into a theory without further
applications of the universal QP . An individual agent’s credences will not yield a
precise judgment of the promise of QP in relation to this episode, nor will all agents
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agree about the significance of a general postulate. However, it is reasonable that
they would disagree, and this is what we see in terms of scientists’ varying attitudes
regarding Planck’s quantum conjecture, and its import for any future theory.
In Chapter 3 though, we saw an instance where the experimental results did
support the general quantum postulate rather than the specific conjecture in
question. I turn now to the Bayesian analysis of this case as an example of a correct
prediction of a subsequently tested formula.
4.5 Correct Prediction
In this explication, I argue that the confirmation of Einstein’s formula can be
understood as support for the general quantum postulate, but that it does not
distinguish between specific quantum conjectures. This helps to clarify the claim
that we should consider Millikan’s experiment as supporting a general QP rather
than the light quanta conjecture.
The quantum postulate gained support from Millikan’s experiments on the
photoelectric effect due to the fact that it allowed Einstein to make a very accurate
prediction about an experimental result, namely, the linear relationship of slope h/e
between V and ν. Predictive power can be cashed out in a Bayesian framework with
a few provisos (Maher, 2004, 72). In general, if evidence E is a logical consequence
of hypothesis H on background B, then P (H|E) > P (H) provided that
0 < P (H) < 1 and P (E|¬H) < 1. In our case, H is QP and E is the expression of
the linear relationship between V and ν. That is, E: “In photoelectric effect
experiments, the stopping voltage V and the frequency of incident light ν display a
linear relationship.” We have seen how Einstein’s light quanta conjecture, in
conjunction with other assumptions about the absorption of energy in a
photoelectric substance, yields the prediction that 1
2
mv2 = V · e = hν − p regarding
the energy being emitted. This entails the linear relationship between V and ν.
In order to draw the conclusion, we must also consider whether the provisos are
satisfied in this case. The first proviso states that our credence in QP must not be
either 0 or 1. As I have discussed, we assume that an agent’s credal state is
expressed by a family C of credence functions, all expressing possible credences in
QP . I argued that such a credal state would contain multiple credence functions, all
of which assign value greater than 0 to QP , but distributed largely at the lower end
of the spectrum. Thus, the imprecise version satisfies the first proviso. As for the
second proviso, which expresses the idea that one should not be sure that the linear
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relationship e obtains if QP were not the case, this is also satisfied as there was
debate about the nature of the relationship between V and ν which was
independent of the status of QP or any alternatives. After Millikan’s experiments,
it was reasonable to have a credence very close to 1 for the statement E. It follows
that P (QP |E) > P (QP ), and QP received support from Millikan’s demonstration
of the linear relationship between V and ν.
I now turn to a defence of my identification of the general quantum postulate as
the hypothesis receiving support rather than the light quanta conjecture, especially
given that Millikan’s experiments are now generally taken to be good evidence for
the existence of light quanta. The first reason is simply that it is a more historically
accurate reconstruction. After all, Millikan is specifically testing the numerical
Equation 3.1 that Einstein provides, and while this may have arisen in part from the
light quanta conjecture, I have already argued for the idea that one can consider the
equation promising without accepting the underlying physical idea. There is nothing
in Millikan’s experimental setup that requires the assumption of light quanta.
More importantly, the support here does not differentiate between alternative
explanations of why the linear relationship holds. This is because, if we were to
consider the support provided to a general hypothesis about light quanta by the
experimental results, we would still have to include a more specific posit such as
Equation 3.1 in the background information to derive the specific linear relationship
being tested. Given that Equation 3.1 is by no means sure in itself, we would be
hiding a crucial piece of information in the background by doing this. Furthermore,
we would need to include this equation in the background of any purported account
of the behaviour of the energy in order for such an account to be supported by the
results. But in that case, the support does not differentiate between the light quanta
conjecture and any other account of the mechanisms governing the behaviour of
energy. In contrast, Einstein’s equation is excellently supported by the results, since
a different postulated expression of the emitted energy would not yield the linear
relationship between V and ν as a logical result. This is why it is reasonable to
consider Millikan’s results as strongly supporting Einstein’s equation, but not
necessarily light quanta, and thus makes it reasonable to hold the equation as
experimentally well determined, but to pursue different explanations for the result.
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4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued that a Bayesian framework making use of imprecise
credences and modeled on tempered personalism is an appropriate way to
reconstruct the arguments arising from the investigation of quantum conjectures.
This stems from the fact that the historical development of quantum theory, which
involved seeming inconsistencies and experimental anomalies in different contexts,
calls for evaluation of arguments within local frameworks. The addition of imprecise
credences allows for a realistic representation of agents’ doxastic states. I showed
how we would define background information B in the evaluation of Planck’s
quantum conjecture to explicate the support it received in terms of experimental
results on blackbody radiation.
I also focused on the significance of Einstein’s correct prediction of the
relationship between V and ν, and I argued that the confirmation of this prediction
provided support to the general quantum postulate. However, we have also seen
that one of the great advances made in Millikan’s experiments was that the
reliability of the experiments and the precision of the results enabled him to
determine the value of the parameter h to a very exact degree. This is crucial, as it
allowed for these results to be used in a comparative way with other measurements
of h through experiments in different domains. The importance of this fact will be
the subject of Chapter 6, but I first turn to a discussion of the ability of the
quantum postulate to account for previously known phenomena.
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Chapter 5
The Quantum Postulate and Old
Evidence
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I argue that given some formal assumptions that capture certain
intuitions that are reasonable and historically borne out, we can see how the
Bayesian framework yields the result that an agent should judge that the quantum
postulate was supported by accounting for previously known phenomena. I consider
some ways in which the accommodation of previously known information was
discussed, and I show how these can be captured in the Bayesian framework if we
adopt a modified version of a solution to the problem of old evidence presented by
Stephan Hartmann and Branden Fitelson in their 2015 paper. The paper provides a
brief discussion of their general result, but it is left an open question whether it can
be applied to any genuine scientific cases. I argue that historical considerations of
the applications of a quantum postulate show that this explication does not quite
capture an important feature of the support in this period: namely, that the
quantum postulate was able to give an account of highly anomalous phenomena. I
introduce two new assumptions to mitigate this problem, and I defend their
applicability in the context being discussed. The support by way of old evidence
contrasts with Millikan’s work, which I explicated as support by way of a confirmed
prediction of a specific formula.
I first provide a brief recapitulation of the relevant phenomena, namely, the
specific heat of diamond and Balmer’s formula for the spectrum of hydrogen. I
contrast the application of a quantum conjecture to these domains with Einstein’s
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use of light quanta to explain Stokes’s Rule in order to highlight the importance of
the fact that the phenomena being explained are anomalous. I claim that an
explication of a reasonable agent’s thought processes should reflect this fact. I then
present Hartmann & Fitelson’s solution to the problem of old evidence and show
how their solution can accomplish this with the addition of a few new assumptions.
I defend the idea that these assumptions accurately capture the historical cases in
question, and show how this results in an appropriate explication of the support
provided to the quantum postulate by these phenomena. I conclude that in the
framework of imprecise credences, there is no definitive answer regarding how much
the evidence boosts the level of promise of the quantum postulate. However, it is
reasonable to think that being able to accommodate these phenomena did indeed
contribute to a judgment that the quantum postulate was promising.
5.2 Phenomena to consider
In Section 2.2.3, I discussed Einstein’s treatment of the specific heats of solids and,
in particular, his use of a quantum conjecture to explain the observed value of the
specific heat of diamond. Recall that, before 1907, no one had considered the idea
that Planck’s work on blackbody radiation could be related to observations of
specific heats. Einstein’s quantization of the phase space of an oscillator modeling a
molecule of diamond allowed him to give an account of why the specific heat of
diamond was so much lower than expected. Thus, his analysis turned the observed
specific heat of diamond at room temperature into evidence for the quantum
postulate. The importance of this fact can be inferred from scientists’ reactions to
this result: in the years following Einstein’s work, Walther Nernst performed new
experiments on the measurement of specific heats at definite temperatures (Klein,
1965). In other words, this work prompted quick and enthusiastic uptake by Nernst
and others, presumably because of its ability to account for a phenomenon that
previously defied explanation by classical means.
We also saw in Section 2.2.4 that Bohr’s use of a quantum conjecture was
directed towards providing a preliminary theory of the structure of the atom. What
is more relevant for this chapter is the fact that this account of atomic structure
allowed Bohr to provide an account of Balmer’s formula, which described the
observed spectral emission lines of hydrogen gas when heated.
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The Balmer formula is expressed as follows.
λ = B
(
m2
m2 − n2
)
(5.1)
where n = 2, m is an integer ≥ 2, B is a constant. Written in terms of frequency
and explicit values for the constant, and generalized to allow for different integers
for n and m, this becomes
ν =
2pi2me4
h3
(
1
τ 22
− 1
τ 21
)
. (5.2)
These precise spectral lines could not be explained on the classical theory.
Indeed, one might say they were doubly anomalous. One would first expect,
according to classical electromagnetic theory, that an electron orbiting a nucleus
would emit energy proportional to its rotational frequency, and that this frequency
would change continuously as the energy is emitted. Yet, the emitted radiation was
of a number of specific frequencies, as manifested in a number of discrete lines on
the spectrum. Furthermore, even if one were to accept the existence of stable states
in the atom, classical physics predicts that the lines of the higher harmonics should
be sums of the fundamental frequencies, whereas the observed spectral lines were
expressed by Ritz in his ‘combination principle’ as differences between the
harmonics (Jammer, 1966, p. 69). Therefore, this made Bohr’s accomplishment
even more significant.
Although Balmer’s formula had been identified as accurately describing the
observed spectral lines, there was no theoretical account of how and why these lines
were produced until Bohr put forth his model of the hydrogen atom. On this model,
electrons moved in stationary orbits that were determined in part by the parameter
h. Upon transition from one energy level to another, an electron would emit a
discrete amount of energy, hν. Bohr considered the case of a hydrogen atom, which
was generally accepted as a system in which a single electron rotated around a
positive nucleus of charge e. According to his earlier calculations, the binding of an
electron to a positive nucleus in a transition to that stable state would result in
emitted energy of amount
Wτ =
2pi2me4
τ 2h2
. (5.3)
To express the amount of energy emitted by the system when transitioning from
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state τ = τ1 to τ = τ2, we have
Wτ2 −Wτ1 =
2pi2me4
h2
·
(
1
τ 22
− 1
τ 21
)
. (5.4)
This is simply an expression of the formula put forth by Balmer, where B is
replaced by more specific constants. Thus, Bohr was able to use a quantum
postulate to account for this previously observed phenomenon. The idea gained
support when it was discovered that in conjunction with other specific assumptions,
it could account for the anomalous spectral lines. Again, scientists were enthusiastic
about the quantum postulate in the context of the old quantum theory despite the
latter’s incomplete nature once it became known that these facts were able to
account for previously unexplained phenomena.
I have discussed two cases where a quantum postulate was able to account for
experimental results that were already known. However, we can contrast this with
another case of explanation of a previously known phenomenon, namely, Einstein’s
use of a quantum postulate in his 1905 light quanta paper to explain Stokes’s Rule,
which was an experimentally well-confirmed result dating back to 1852. Einstein
considered observations of photoluminescence, where monochromatic light is
changed to light of a different frequency when being absorbed and re-emitted by
various forms of matter. He assumed that the original and the changed light consist
of energy quanta, and that an incoming light quantum was responsible for an
outgoing light quantum. By conservation of energy, he reasoned that the final energy
of a light quantum would have to be less than that of an initial light quantum or,
symbolically, R
N
βν2 ≤ RN βν1. This is simply an expression of Stokes’s Rule.
Despite the fact that Einstein’s explanation of Stokes’s Rule provided an account
of a phenomeon that was previously known, scientists did not react with any great
enthusiasm. One might argue that this is simply because most found the idea of
light quanta too radical, and that such a hypothesis would need far more direct
experimental evidence in order to be seriously taken up by many people. Yet, it is
worth considering why this was such a contrast to the reception of Einstein’s
quantum postulate as applied to specific heats. Despite the fact that early
applications of the postulate to specific heats could not be tested in experimentally
precise ways, it was received as an extremely promising explanation of the
phenomenon in question and triggered several rounds of new experiments almost
immediately.
I claim that this was because the use of a quantum postulate provided an
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account of phenomena that were not only previously known and inexplicable by
other means, but that indeed seemed to be in direct conflict with the dominant
theories of the time. Such a feature makes the need for an account of the
phenomenon much more urgent, and I claim this was operative in the cases of
specific heats and spectral lines discussed above. I will now proceed to show how a
particular account of old evidence can take this into account.
5.3 Bayesian analysis
I now turn to the task of providing a Bayesian explication of the support provided
to a quantum postulate here, and defend the idea that Hartmann & Fitelson’s
analysis best represents the historical reasons that the promise of QP was raised by
these cases. Recall that the goal of my analysis is to show that given some formal
assumptions that I claim capture certain intuitions that are reasonable and
historically borne out, we can see how the Bayesian framework yields the result that
an agent, upon learning that the quantum postulate accounted for previously known
phenomena, should raise their credence in the postulate. I will first briefly address
the Bayesian problem of old evidence.
The “problem of old evidence” in Bayesian epistemology has been discussed
extensively, and it is generally understood that there are several issues that might
bear this name.1 I restrict my attention to the following situation. Consider the
time shortly after a theory has been formulated. In our case, we consider not a full
theory, but a quantum postulate. We restrict our attention to a hypothesis H in
that theory and assume other information is contained in background B. Imagine
that it is discovered that a previously known fact E can be accounted for in some
way by H. This newly discovered relation seems to affect the support for the theory
in some way, such as in the cases I discussed above. Another classic example is
found in the increased confidence in Einstein’s theory of general relativity due to its
explanation of the previously known precession of Mercury’s perihelion. Therefore,
intuitively and historically, it seems that old evidence can provide support for a new
hypothesis. However, some have claimed that in the Bayesian framework, it is
difficult to account for why this should be.
One issue is with the notion of what it means for evidence E to confirm a
hypothesis H. Although there are several ways of explicating this process, the most
basic is the idea that upon learning a piece of evidence E, an agent’s degree of belief
1See, for instance Garber (1983), Jeffrey (1983), Christensen (1999).
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in H should be revised according to the conditionalization formula,
Pr(H|E) = Pr(H) · Pr(E|H)
Pr(E)
, (5.5)
where all quantities are understood to be conditional on background information
B. The problem is that for any evidence E that is already known, Pr(E) and
Pr(E|H) have the value 1, and so Pr(H|E) has the same value as Pr(H). Thus,
any fact that is already known at the time that we are considering a new hypothesis
H cannot raise our credence in H. If we think that E confirms H if and only if
Pr(H|E&B) ≥ Pr(H|B), then in this case, E does not confirm H. If we think that
all of an agent’s knowledge must be represented in the probability distribution, then
E must be included in B. In this case, the problem is rooted in the assumption that
an agent is perfectly logically omniscient and thus was aware of the relations
between H and E as soon as theory T , which contains H, was formulated. If that is
so, there is no new fact about the relation between E and H that can change the
agent’s credence in H. Thus, Garber (1983), Jeffrey (1983) and Eells (1990) among
others discuss solutions that eliminate the assumption of logical omniscience on the
grounds that it is an unrealistic representation of any agent’s degrees of belief.
This is the strategy used by Hartmann and Fitelson in their 2015 solution. This
solution relies on the claim that what is learned is some kind of relation, which may
be logical, between a hypothesis H and evidence E, and that it is the discovery of
this fact that provides support to the hypothesis.2 This reflects the fact that what
seemed to motivate scientists’ further consideration of a quantum postulate was
their learning that it accounted for previously known, anomalous phenomena. In
Hartmann & Fitelson’s approach, they introduce various formal conditions which,
when satisfied, yield the result that learning that H accounts for E contributes to
the support for H in an incremental sense.
The solution requires four ordinal assumptions for the support to go through:
1. Pr(H|X&¬Y ) > Pr(H|¬X&¬Y )
2. Pr(H|X&¬Y ) > Pr(H|¬X&Y )
3. Pr(H|X&Y ) > Pr(H|¬X&Y )
2Hartmann & Fitelson discuss their solution in terms of the confirmation of a theory T rather
than a hypothesis. Since I am interested in the role of QP specifically, I take it to be the
hypothesis whose support is in question, and that the contents of B are accepted for the purposes
of the consideration of H.
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4. Pr(H|X&Y ) ≥ Pr(H|¬X&¬Y )
These statements X and Y have to do with whether a hypothesis adequately
accounts for the evidence in question. X is the statement that hypothesis H
adequately accounts for evidence E. Y is the statement that a different hypothesis
or theory H ′ adequately accounts for evidence E. The proof proceeds by noting
that these ordinal assumptions lead to the result that P (H|X) > P (H). To see this,
define the following probabilities in this way:
• a = P (H|X&¬Y )
• b = P (H|X&Y )
• c = P (H|¬X&¬Y )
• d = P (H|¬X&Y )
Also, x = P (¬Y |X), y = P (¬Y |¬X). The ordinal assumptions above can then
be expressed as follows.
1. a > c
2. a > d
3. b > d
4. b ≥ c
Now, consider the following, where x > 0 and y < 1.
ax+ b(1− x) = (ay + a(1− y))x+ (by + b(1− y))(1− x)
> (cy + d(1− y))x+ (cy + d(1− y))(1− x)
= cy(x+ 1− x) + d(1− y)(x+ 1− x)
= cy + d(1− y)
Therefore, we have,
ax+ b(1− x) > cy + d(1− y). (5.6)
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Now, given the definitions of a, b and x, and the fact that
1− Pr(¬Y |X) = Pr(Y |X), we have
ax+ b(1− x) = Pr(H|X&¬Y )Pr(¬Y |X) + Pr(H|X&Y )Pr(Y |X) (5.7)
By the rule of total probability, the right-hand side is equal to Pr(H|X).
Similarly, given the definitions of c, d and y, we have
cy + d(1− y) = Pr(H|¬X&¬Y )Pr(¬Y |¬X) + Pr(H|¬X&Y )Pr(Y |¬X). (5.8)
Again, the rule of total probability yields the fact that the right-hand side is
equal to Pr(H|¬X). It follows from these that Pr(H|X) > Pr(H|¬X). This in
turn entails that P (H|X) > P (H) and, in fact, that the difference depends on the
difference between the two sides of the inequality (5.6).
Although the conditions given by Hartmann & Fitelson are meant to be
plausible enough to apply in any case, it is useful to consider what they mean in our
particular contexts. The assumptions are all based on comparative probabilities of
H, conditional on various combinations of ways that QP and classical theory can
account for the phenomena of specific heat of diamond or Balmer’s formula, or fail
to do so. In the case of specific heats, we would have X and Y as the following.
• X: “QP adequately explains (or accounts for) E, the measured specific heat
of diamond near room temperature.”
• Y : “The assumptions of classical theory adequately explain (or account for)
E, the measured specific heat of diamond.”3
The first condition states that QP is more likely if it is able to account for the
specific heat of diamond than if neither it nor any other theory could account for
this phenomenon. Historically, it was this ability to explain the phenomenon that
rendered it a promising postulate for many scientists, so the ordinal ranking is
reasonable. The second condition says that QP is more likely if it accounts for the
specific heat of diamond than if some other theory were the only one that could
adequately do so. This reflects the idea that if classical theory could account for the
3I conduct my analysis in terms of specific heats, but the same points apply, mutatis mutandis,
to the account of Balmer’s formula by Bohr’s old quantum theory.
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specific heat values and QP could not, there would have been no reason to think of
QP as being promising in relation to this phenomenon. The third condition says
that QP is less likely in the case that only classical theory could explain the specific
heat than in the case where both QP and classical theory are possible explanations
of the specific heat. This seems reasonable, since even if classical theory were also
able to account for the specific heat, the ability of QP to do so as well seems like it
would render it at least somewhat interesting. The last condition states that QP is
at least as likely if both it and another theory explain the specific heat than if no
theory at all does so. Again, this seems reasonable: imagine that at the same time
that QP was shown to be able to account for the specific heat, a plausible way of
adjusting classical theories to account for the phenomenon was also suggested. One
might not think that QP is extremely likely in this case, but its ability to account
for the phenomenon should not make it less likely than previously.
Given these assumptions, Hartmann & Fitelson show that
Pr(QP |X) > Pr(QP ). This means that, if one were to learn that QP accounts for
the specific heat of diamond, then this raises one’s degree of belief in QP. In fact, we
can say something further. Let us consider the difference between Pr(QP |X) and
Pr(QP ):
Pr(QP |X)− Pr(QP ) = Pr(¬X)[Pr(QP |X)− Pr(QP |¬X)]. (5.9)
Let us suppose that the conditional probabilities for QP on X and ¬X are fixed,
regardless of the value of Pr(X). Then the amount to which one’s degree of belief
in QP is raised is proportional to Pr(¬X), or inversely proportional to Pr(X). This
means that if prior to learning definitely that QP accounts for the specific heat, one
already thought that this was likely to be the case, then learning this fact does not
add as much to the support for QP as if one were more skeptical of the idea that
QP could account for this phenomenon. In our particular case, it does appear that
it would be relatively surprising that QP was able to account for the specific heat of
diamond. This is, in part, due to the fact that the postulate itself was not obviously
reconcilable with successful aspects of classical physics. What made it even more
surprising was its application to a context that seemed unrelated to any of the
contexts in which it was previously successful, i.e. to a theory of energy in matter
rather than the context of energy transmission between radiation and matter. Thus,
it seems reasonable that Einstein’s demonstration that a quantum postulate could
account for certain aspects of the specific heat of diamond was a not insignificant
factor in raising scientists’ degrees of belief in this hypothesis.
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One might be worried that this implies that a hypothesis H is not supported by
its account of previously known information that is not anomalous. However, it is
important to note that the situation here is specifically about conditionalization
upon learning that a relation exists between H and E, and thus does not affect the
prior value of Pr(H). Presumably, this is determined at the time of the initial
advancement of H, and at this point, such a hypothesis is usually only suggested if
it is able to take into account much of the same facts as the original theory. This
explication may not be appropriate in contexts where a theory is explicitly designed
to account for an anomalous phenomenon, but I claim that it is an accurate
explication of the cases I discuss.
Although X and Y are to be conditionalized upon in the ordinal judgments, I
am also concerned with the matter of credences in X and Y , so it is worth
considering what other assumptions should be included in B in order to generate
these credences. In the case of specific heats, we need to include the following
assumptions, as taken from Einstein (1907, p. 219):
1. The atoms of a solid can be modelled as sinusoidal oscillators about
equilibrium positions.
2. The molecular kinetic equation for energy of the oscillators can be applied.
3. The phase space of an individual oscillator of frequency ν can be quantized in
areas hν.
4. Light atoms vibrate at higher frequencies.
The combination of these yield the fit to the equation for specific heat of
diamond, which generates a high credence in X.
I now turn to the significance of anomalous phenomena I discussed in the
previous section. Hartmann & Fitelson do not address this issue, but I have argued
that an important aspect of the situation was that learning that a proposed theory
accounts for a previously known phenomenon does not always seem to be evidence
for that theory. The cases where we put the most weight on old evidence are those
where it was believed that this evidence was not accounted for by any previous
theory. In the classic example of general relativity being able to account for the
precession of the perihelion of Mercury, it was intuitively seen as highly significant
that Einstein’s theory could account for this phenomenon, whereas being able to
account for the observations that Newton’s theory also covered would be expected
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of any competing theory, and would not support the new theory to a degree beyond
the degree of support for the previous one. In the cases of both specific heats of
diamond at room temperature and the spectral lines expressed by Balmer’s formula,
we have seen that historically, it was an important feature that classical theory
yielded predictions that were in direct conflict with observations of this
phenomenon.
I take this fact as an indication of certain conditions that a solution to old
evidence should satisfy. One important one is that an agent’s credence in a
hypothesis should be boosted the most in cases where one learns that it can account
for a phenomenon that previous theories could not account for. In other words, the
incremental support for H (or in our case QP ) should vary with an agent’s credence
in P (Y ). In Hartmann & Fitelson’s solution, we see that one way that such a
correlation holds is in the case where two separate conditions are satisfied:
1. a− c > b− d
2. P (Y ) and P (X) are independent.
When the latter condition holds, P (¬Y |X) = P (¬Y |¬X), so that x = y. When
this is true, we see that Equation 5.6 becomes ax+ b(1− x) > cx+ d(1− x). If the
first condition holds, the difference between the two sides of the equation varies with
x, as desired. I argue that these conditions are satisfied in cases we would intuitively
consider accounting for old evidence to have contributed to an agent’s credence in a
hypothesis.
First consider the assumption that P (Y ) and P (X) are independent. P (Y )
refers to the credence an agent has in the proposition that classical theory accounts
for the specific heat of diamond at room temperature, while P (X) is the credence
an agent has in the proposition that a quantum postulate accounts for the specific
heat of diamond at room temperature. Before the quantum postulate was ever
applied to this phenomenon, it was known that classical theory could not account
for the specific heat, and so P (Y ) was very low. The subsequent use of the quantum
postulate had no bearing on this fact. Thus, it is reasonable to think that at least in
this case, these two probabilities are independent. Similarly, in the case of Balmer’s
formula, Bohr’s introduction of old quantum theory to provide an account of this
formula did not change a low credence in the proposition that classical theory could
account for these spectral lines.
One might be concerned about this condition since the relations between P (X)
and P (Y ) are features of the probability space. Thus, there is perhaps simply a fact
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of the matter that a low credence in Y would affect the credence in X, and so we
cannot assume independence. However, in the situation we are considering, we have
explicitly eliminated the assumption of logical omniscience of the agent. This means
that we can assign values to P (X) and P (Y ) that make sense for an agent in that
context, and at the time point that we are considering, it is reasonable to consider
the two credences as being independent. After all, even if it was known that the
classical theories did not account for the phenomena, the quantum postulate
modifies a very specific aspect of classical theories. Presumably, there are countless
other ways to modify classical theory that would result in hypotheses that would
not account for the specific heat. Of course, this independence condition will not
always hold: for instance, after the formulation of Bohr’s correspondence rule, the
ability of QP to account for phenomena in certain domains would be known to
depend on the ability of certain classical descriptions of phenomena. Such relations
would have to be evaluated with the individual cases in mind.
Now consider the condition that a− c > b− d. This is the same as a condition
that a− b > c− d. The difference a− b is the difference between P (H|X&¬Y ) and
P (H|X&Y ). The difference c− d is the difference between P (H|¬X&Y ) and
P (H|¬X&¬Y ). I claim that it is reasonable to expect the first probability
difference to be larger than the second.
This is because in the first case, we are assuming that H accounts for a
phenomenon, and the difference relies on whether there is another hypothesis that
does the same. In the second case, we are evaluating the probability of a hypothesis
conditional on the fact that the hypothesis does not account for the phenomenon in
question. It seems that the presence of an alternative explanation is meaningful in
the first case, but not in the second. After all, when a hypothesis accounts for
evidence, a reasonable thing to ask is whether there are alternative explanations for
the phenomenon. But if a hypothesis does not account for the evidence in question,
the latter fact seems to be irrelevant. In our particular case, this expresses the idea
that the quantum postulate’s ability to account for the specific heat of diamond
when classical theory could not was significant. In contrast, credence in a quantum
postulate that did not explain the specific heat would be low, regardless of whether
classical theory could account for specific heat or not. Therefore, we would expect
that the difference between c and d is much smaller than any difference between a
and b.
When the two above conditions are satisfied, the difference between P (H|X) and
P (H) will vary with P (¬Y ). Particular numbers will depend of course on the priors
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an agent assigns to all the conditional probabilities. However, this dependence
captures the fact that accounting for something like specific heat, where P (¬Y ) is
very high, will provide relatively more support for QP than accounting for a
phenomenon like Stokes’s Rule, where P (¬Y ) is considerably lower. The foregoing
analysis is important because Hartmann & Fitelson’s solution provides only a
general formal outline. While it yields what seems like a desirable result, it was
unclear whether it truly captured cases we would have wanted it to. I have argued
that it can, and clarified the conditions under which accounting for a previously
known phenomenon is considered confirmatory, showing how this fits into their
suggested solution.
I will now consider how this analysis can be adjusted to be applicable in a
framework of imprecise credences. Recall that an agent’s credal state is composed of
a collection of credence functions. Definite statements about an agent’s credal state
can only be made when all of the credence functions constituting C agree about a
particular fact. Hartmann & Fitelson’s result holds for any situation where the
ordinal assumptions hold. Now, the prior values of Pr(H) will differ from one
credence function to another, as will the conditional probabilities Pr(QP |X), so it
follows that the difference between Pr(QP |X) and Pr(QP ) will vary between the
credence functions. It will thus be impossible to say how much support is provided
to QP when X is learned, since there is no agreement across credence functions.
However, so long as the conditions are satisfied by every member of C, the result
that Pr(QP |X) > Pr(QP ) will hold in every one of those credence functions, and
so we can say that an agent’s credence in QP should be increased when learning X.
Of course, this increase in promise of QP does not task every scientist with the
pursuit of this postulate, since reasonable agents will differ on the level of promise
assigned QP, even if all agree that they have learned that QP accounts for the
specific heat. However, this is to be expected in the context of pursuit, since it is a
feature and not a flaw that scientists pursue various lines of inquiry. Furthermore,
the generality of the conditions is intended to make them universally acceptable,
and, as I have argued, accurately capture the situation with specific heats. However,
it is possible that for some particular agent, the credence functions comprising
credal state C may not satisfy those conditions. Nevertheless, this would be a
minority view, and is certainly permitted in the context of pursuit.
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5.4 Conclusion
I have argued that a particular Bayesian explication can reveal how accounting for
previously known phenomena provides support to a quantum postulate.
Furthermore, by considering some historically motivated conditions, we are able to
see how this formal result can reflect the importance of accounting for anomalous
phenomena as opposed to non-anomalous results.
There are several reasons that this explication of the situation is appropriate.
The introduction of statements X and Y reflect the importance of learning that a
postulate can account for a given phenomenon, which I have argued is the best way
to understand how scientists perceived the importance of the quantum postulate in
the contexts being considered. Furthermore, there is no strict requirement on how
X is satisfied: the phrasing is purposely sufficiently broad such that it allows for the
way in which I have been considering the quantum postulate, as a postulate that
does not necessarily have a firm physical interpretation, but that can nevertheless
yield results when combined with other pieces of background knowledge.
This way of approaching the problem works well in a tempered personalist
framework, where we are not assuming logical omniscience of the agents. Instead,
we consider statements on an explicitly defined background B. As I have argued,
including certain elements in B allowed scientists to consider X acceptable, that is,
that QP in conjunction with the contents of B did account for the phenomenon
under consideration. In this explication, I accepted that X is satisfied, but I argued
for a role for P (Y ), since Y was not satisfied. This explication thus shows that
phenomena that are not clearly anomalous in a given framework provide less
support for a new hypothesis.
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Chapter 6
Unification and the Quantum
Postulate: Agreeing Measurements
of Planck’s Constant1
6.1 Introduction
In previous chapters, I have mainly discussed the support for quantum conjectures
in the context of the individual domains in which these conjectures were being
applied. In this chapter, I provide an analysis of the unificatory power of the
quantum postulate. I argue that we can understand the experiments in different
contexts as providing measurements of the parameter h. In a Bayesian framework,
we can interpret each of these measurements as constraining the value of h and thus
yielding information about the quantum postulate that can then be applied in other
domains. This way of explicating unificatory power yields the result that the
quantum postulate received support over and above that from each of the individual
experiments in virtue of its ability to make the different domains relevant to one
another.
I begin by outlining some of the ways unification has been characterized in the
literature, then present the Bayesian notion of informational relevance that I will be
defending. I provide a brief overview of the phenomena that were being unified,
focusing in particular on how they provided measurements of h. I present an
analysis in the tempered personalist framework I have been using to argue that the
1A version of this chapter has been published as “Unificatory Power in the Old Quantum
Theory: Informational Relevance of the Quantum Hypothesis,” Philosophy of Science, 82(5),
1200-1210.
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quantum postulate received support from this unificatory power. Finally, I draw
some conclusions for theory pursuit based on this analysis.
6.2 Unification
The idea that unification is a virtue of a scientific theory has a long history in
philosophy of science, and has been presented in several guises. Accounts range over
those focused primarily on the common causal origins of various phenomena to
those emphasizing the importance of a common explanatory basis. Of course, these
are not mutually exclusive ideas and a combination of these elements is common.
William Whewell, for instance, emphasizes what he calls the Consilience of
Inductions in his Novum Organon Renovatum (Whewell, 1989). An important part
of Whewell’s conception of science is the practice of providing a mathematical
description of phenomena, which he calls an ‘induction’ due to scientists’ addition of
a formula to the characterization of observations. A Consilience of Inductions
occurs when an induction obtained from one class of facts is found to apply to
another class of facts, even though the two previously seemed to be unrelated.
Whewell takes this to be a good indicator of probable truth. He says,
[T]he evidence in favour of our induction is of a much higher and more
forcible character when it enables us to explain and determine cases of a
kind different from those which were contemplated in the formation of
our hypothesis. The instances in which this has occurred, indeed,
impress us with a conviction that the truth of our hypothesis is certain.
No accident could give rise to such an extraordinary coincidence
(Whewell, 1989, p. 153, emphasis in original).
Thus, he argues that when a hypothesis is able to explain or predict facts of a
kind that were not used in its generation, the evidence for that hypothesis is
stronger than it was before on the grounds that it could not be mere coincidence
that two disparate phenomena are explained by the same hypothesis. Instead, it is
much more likely that the hypothesis does actually apply in some way to all the
phenomena it explains.
A more recent version of this argument is given by Michel Janssen, in his work
on common origin inferences (2002). Janssen coined the term COI Stories, an
acronym for common origin inferences, which he considers a subspecies of Inferences
to the Best Explanation. Janssen explains what he means by a COI thus:
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A COI, like an IBE, can be defined as an inference from a statement of
the form “If it were the case that X, then that would explain
observations/phenomena a, b, c, . . . ” to “It is, in fact, the case that X.”
The distinguishing characteristic of a COI is that X – a statement, a
model, or an idea . . . – wields its explanatory power by tracing a number
of otherwise puzzling coincidences . . . to a common origin (Janssen, 2002,
p. 464).
COIs thus arise out of what Janssen calls common-origin explanations, which are
hypotheses or theories that tie together multiple phenomena. He believes that most
COIs will be common-cause inferences, in which some kind of causal structure is
posited as being responsible for several phenomena. Of course, the notion of ‘causal
structure’ here is quite broad, possibly referring to some event or substance with
causal efficacy, or a causal structure or mechanism broadly construed (Janssen,
2002, p. 12). The latter could presumably include such things as physical laws
described by some mathematical structure, and so does not restrict a common-cause
argument to traditionally conceived causal relations.
Janssen is concerned to argue that if a hypothesis is able to explain the
occurrence of multiple previously unrelated phenomena, the hypothesis is thereby
conferred epistemic warrant. He tries to show that a theory’s possessing
explanatory power does generally count as evidence for that theory.2 Janssen
marshals a variety of historical and scientific examples to support his claim that
such COIs have played a prominent role in the history of science, including the
argument for a Copernican system, Darwin’s argument in the Origin of Species,
Newton’s argument for universal gravitation, and the move to special relativity.3
Janssen’s primary purpose is to show that there is a link between explanatory power
and evidentiary warrant. However, at the end of the paper, Janssen points out that
there is still a question of whether there is any epistemic force behind COIs as
2Here, theory stands as shorthand for anything between a well-formulated scientific theory, to
a loose hypothesis.
3Interestingly, Janssen says that his COIs are analogous to Whewell’s Colligation of Facts
rather than the Consilience of Inductions. This is because the former refers to a process similar to
finding a formula that describes particular observations of phenomena. Since individual
observations are already separate instances, they must be unified by some conception. Finding a
mathematical formula that captures the behaviour of the observed entities could be seen as finding
a causal structure, in a very loose sense of the term, on Janssen’s view. Whewell’s Consilience of
Inductions is instead comparable to “meta-COIs,” inferences that posit a higher-level unification
between two or more COIs.
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opposed to their being of mere pragmatic value, and what this force might consist
of. One such answer to this question is given by Wayne Myrvold, in his 2003 work
on Bayesian unification.4 I will argue that the epistemic force in this case can be
seen as one of informational relevance.
In his paper, Myrvold shows that on a particular understanding of what it
means for a hypothesis to unify phenomena, its ability to do so contributes directly
to its support. He begins with a common definition of the informational relevance
of a proposition P1 to another proposition P2, conditional on background B,
I(P2, P1|B) = Log2Pr(P2|P1&B)
Pr(P2|B) . (6.1)
He then defines the quantity U as a measure of the extent to which a hypothesis
H unifies P1 and P2,
U(P1, P2;H|B) = I(P2, P1|H&B)− I(P2, P1|B). (6.2)
This generalizes straightforwardly to a set of propositions P1 . . . Pn. He then
shows that on two common candidates for the degree to which evidence supports a
hypothesis, the quantity U contributes directly to the support of H by the evidence.
Consider, for instance, the “degree of confirmation.” This is simply one way to
measure the degree of support for a hypothesis, but a similar result holds if one
takes an alternative measure, Good’s “weight of evidence.” If we now consider
evidence statements E rather than propositions P , the “degree of confirmation,”
measured by log2
Pr(H|E)
Pr(H)
, is identical to the definition of the informational relevance
of E to H, so we can consider the informational relevance as a measure of evidential
support. From Bayes’ theorem, and the definition of informational relevance which
is additive, one obtains for the informational relevance of pieces of evidence E1 and
E2 to hypothesis H,
I(H,E1&E2|B) = I(H,E1|B) + I(H,E2|B) + U(E1, E2;H|B). (6.3)
Myrvold explains the significance as follows. “[T]he degree of support provided
to H by E1 and E2 taken together is the sum of three terms: the degree of support
of H by E1 alone, the degree of support of H by E2 alone, and an additional term
4Other related conceptions of unification can be found in Philip Kitcher’s work on explanatory
unification (1989) and William Wimsatt on robustness (1981). While the details of such
discussions differ, it is clear that some version of this notion has played a role in several important
episodes of scientific theorizing.
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which is simply the degree of unification of the set {E1, E2} by H. An analogous
result holds for larger bodies of evidence” (2003, 412). Thus, the ability of a
hypothesis to unify previously unrelated phenomena contributes directly to the
likelihood of that hypothesis given the evidence.
In what follows, I will provide details of how the case under consideration
provides an example of this feature. Briefly, the physical phenomena to be discussed
were not clearly relevant to one another before considering the general quantum
postulate. However, on the assumption of such a hypothesis, numerical values of
quantities obtained from observations of those phenomena could be used to
calculate the value of Planck’s constant, h. All of these calculations agree to within
an order of magnitude. The measured value of h via one type of phenomenon thus
provided information about the measured value of h via a different phenomenon
when assuming the quantum postulate. This captures a type of unificatory power
that was epistemically significant and contributed to the justification of the pursuit
of various theories that incorporated the idea of quantization, even in the absence of
a well-developed quantum theory.
6.3 Informational relevance
Because this explication of unification is a Bayesian analysis, it will be important to
be clear about the types of assumptions that are being included in the background
information B. In the overview that follows, I will focus on the assumptions we
should consider to be included in B in order to make inferences about the numerical
value of h. I argue that the background information should be considered as
including mainly claims about the function of the measurement apparatuses being
used, and the mathematical expressions of phenomena inferred from observations.
In this way, we see how the general quantum postulate was being confirmed with
respect to this shared background that was accepted for the purposes of the context
in question.
6.3.1 Blackbody radiation
As we have seen in Section 2.2.1, Planck’s quantum conjecture was put forth in
order to arrive at the empirically well supported radiation formula, Equation 2.1.
He introduced the notion of an ‘energy element’ , of size hν, and then rewrote the
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previous equation in terms of wavelength,
E =
8pich
λ5
1
ech/kλT − 1 . (6.4)
He was then able to use this empirically confirmed radiation formula to estimate the
size of h. He used his formula to calculate the amount of radiation in air, and
compared this with values obtained by Ferdinand Kurlbaum in his experimental
work (1898). He then drew on observations made by Otto Lummer and Ernst
Pringsheim, who were able to determine the wavelength of the maximum energy in
air of blackbody radiation. The result was a numerical value for the parameter h,
h = 6.55 · 10−27erg · sec.5
I stressed in earlier chapters that Planck was focused on providing an account of
observationally motivated descriptions of phenomena using a general model of
‘resonators’ while hoping that electron theory would later be able to fill in the gaps,
so to speak, on how such mechanisms were taking place. As Gearhart has pointed
out, Planck repeatedly stressed the need for a physical interpretation of the
constants he introduced (2002, p. 200). Despite this, we can still see how the
quantum postulate had unificatory power by examining its application in other
phenomena. It is important to note that in the following presentations, I present
examples where Planck’s constant is invoked in various ways, often as a starting
assumption allowing one to derive results. Thus, even though it is important for my
argument that results of experiments can be construed as ways of measuring the
value of h, scientists were for the most part neither directly trying to determine the
value of h, or even taking the existence or value of h as a primary hypothesis in an
H-D scenario. Nevertheless, the reconstruction I provide is based solely on
information that was available at the time, and so the epistemic feature of
unification was applicable whether it was explicitly recognised or not.
6.3.2 Light phenomena
I have already discussed Einstein’s introduction of the light quanta conjecture, and
Millikan’s subsequent investigation of the photoelectric effect. While Millikan’s work
is clearly significant for its measurement of h, in this section, I will consider in more
detail Einstein’s original treatment of the photoelectric effect, and how it too can be
taken as a preliminary constraint on the value of h.
5Error values were not reported in Planck’s 1901 article.
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Recall Einstein’s Equation 3.1,
1
2
mv2 = V · e = hν − p, (6.5)
describing the relation between the potential required to stop electrons from
escaping a metal surface, and the frequency of the incident light. We can consider
this equation in terms of our discussion of informational relevance due to the fact
that the experiments done on the photoelectric effect yield information about the
size of h. One can derive a relation between the energy of electrons and the size of h
based on the kinetic energy of the electrons being emitted. Einstein reasoned that
V E = Rhν/k − p, where the body under investigation is charged to positive
potential V , E is the charge of a gram equivalent of an ion, and p is the potential of
negative electricity.6 Experiments on the photoelectric effect provided observed
values for the unknowns in this relation. Known quantities could then be inserted
into this formula: R is a known constant, E = 9.6 · 103, P ′ = 0, ν = 1.03 · 1015. The
value of ν corresponds to frequencies of ultraviolet light, and the other values are
given for an experimental setup. The order of magnitude of V according to Lenard’s
results was 107. Einstein calculated the theoretical value of V E according to his
theoretical assumptions, and found that his theoretical value of V was in good
accord with the experimental results of Lenard. This provided a constraint for the
value of h even though at the time it could only have been given within an order of
magnitude. Because Einstein’s β was equivalent to h/k and the order of magnitude
of β had 10−11, the measured value of a body’s resistance in cases of the
photoelectric effect constrained h to be of order of magnitude 10−27.7
Let us now explain how this fits into the Bayesian framework by determining
how the various experiments provide information about h. First, note that by
beginning with the quantum postulate, one can calculate the average energy of the
resonators Planck was considering in order to obtain the radiation formula Equation
6.4. However, this equation refers only to the form of a family of equations, where
the value of h is not yet determined. Thus, let E1 be the proposition expressing the
results of Lummer and Pringsheim’s work determining the maximum wavelength of
blackbody radiation in air at a given temperature, “λmT = 0.294cm ·K.” Let E2 be
6Einstein’s original notation is ΠE = Rβν − P ′, which I have changed for consistency.
However, I follow Einstein in discussing quantities in terms of ‘gram equivalents’.
7This is not the structure of Einstein’s reasoning: he hypothesizes from light quanta to the
result that the resistance should be a certain value, then confirms that this matches the
experimental value.
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the proposition that an experiment on the photoelectric effect would yield a result
such that V is of the order of magnitude 107. From E1, in conjunction with QP as
applied in deriving Equation 6.4, we can calculate that h = 6.55 · 10−27erg · sec.
Similarly, the results of E2 in conjunction with QP yield the result that h is of the
order of magnitude 10−27.
Before continuing with the analysis of the unificatory power of QP , I will
consider how we can define background knowledge B to make such a judgment. In
the case of blackbody radiation, I presented the assumptions necessary to derive the
radiation equation in Section 4.2, and I argued that these assumptions were
supported mainly by experimental results in the case of phenomenological laws such
as Wien’s displacement law and the Stefan-Boltzmann law, and did not include any
fatal inconsistencies. It is thus possible to combine this information with the
information required to infer a result in the case of the photoelectric effect. In the
latter case, these assumptions require the assumptions that electrons within a metal
can escape the surface with a certain amount of work, and that additional electron
energy is manifested as kinetic energy. Since I am considering the unificatory power
of the general quantum postulate, background information B would also include
specific posits about how the general postulate is applied in each context: in the
context of blackbody radiation, we would have a specific posit about the quantum
postulate defining the size of energy elements, and in the case of the photoelectric
effect, a posit that the quantum postulate determines the energy of individual
quanta of light.
To return to the analysis of unification, we see that before the suggestion of QP ,
there was no way to use E1 to yield information about E2. Thus, the informational
relevance of E1 to E2 on background B, given by Equation 6.1, was very low. After
all, there was no way that Lummer & Pringsheim’s experiments on blackbody
radiation would be thought to constrain the behaviour of cathode rays, so
Pr(E2|E1&B) should be the same as Pr(E2|B), thus assigning I(E2, E1|B) the
value 0. Compare this with the informational relevance value on the assumption of
QP along with background B. This is given by the expression
I(E2, E1|QP&B) = Log2Pr(E2|E1&QP&B)
Pr(E2|QP&B) . (6.6)
The value of Pr(E2|QP&B) is the probability that Lenard’s results would
obtain, which does not have a particularly high value if considered against a general
background. However, once we consider E1 as well, we can calculate a value for h
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from the blackbody spectrum, thus constraining the value we would obtain from
experiments on the photoelectric effect. This yields a very high value for
Pr(E2|E1&QP&B), arguably a value very close to one, thus making the value of
the information relevance of E1 to E2 quite high.
8
Now recall that the unificatory power of QP is given by Equation 6.2, which
measures the difference between the relevance of E1 to E2 when including QP in the
background knowledge, and excluding it. This nonzero value contributes directly to
the degree of confirmation of QP by E1 and E2 as measured by Equation 6.3. Thus,
by positing behaviour of radiation in terms of quanta of size hν, the form of the
blackbody radiation spectrum constrained possible values of measurements
conducted on the phenomenon of the photoelectric effect by providing information
about the size of h. We see that QP gained confirmational power not only from the
results of the individual experiments, but directly from the way in which it made
these phenomena informationally relevant to one another.
6.3.3 Spectral phenomena
A quantum postulate and the value of h were also crucial in early characterizations
of the structure of the atom, as well as the behaviour of line spectra. I have already
discussed some of the details in Sections 2.2.4 and 5.2. In the latter, I described the
process by which Bohr was able to account for the Balmer formula describing the
emission spectrum of hydrogen gas. In this section, I explain how we can interpret
the observation of these lines as providing information about the value of h.
Balmer’s formula 5.1 had no known connection with the other phenomena
discussed above until Bohr developed his model of the atom. We have seen how
Bohr calculated relations between several observable quantities based on Planck’s
radiation theory utilizing h. We can reinterpret this as a way to turn the observed
line spectra into information about the size of h by including in background
knowledge B the fact that Balmer’s formula could be used to describe emission
spectra. According to Bohr’s calculations,
2pi2me4
h3
= 3.1 · 1015. (6.7)
The observed value was 3.290 · 1015, which we see is remarkably close to Bohr’s
8Again, this epistemic analysis does not conform in structure to the historical development of
these ideas, as Planck worked backwards from the radiation formula to infer a quantum conjecture.
Nevertheless, I claim that this logical structure holds for the experiments I address.
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calculated value as given in Equation 6.7.
We can reverse the calculation in order to see how such an experiment would
have constrained the value of h. We use the same experimental values that Bohr
used for the charge of the electron e = 4.7 · 10−10 and the ratio of the charge to mass
e/m = 5.31 · 1017, as well as the observed value of 3.290 · 1015 and solve for h in the
expression above. The result is h = 6.38 · 10−27. Thus, we see how Balmer’s formula
carried information about the size of h, which was also given by the blackbody
spectrum.
In order to make the informational relevance explicit, let us take E1, as above, to
be the statement of Lummer & Pringsheim’s results on the maximum wavelength of
blackbody radiation in air, λmT = 0.294cm ·K. Let E2 here be that the value on
the left side of Equation 6.7 takes on a value around 3.290 · 1015. As before, a value
of this constant without the assumption of QP could a priori have taken on an
infinite range of values, and the result of measurements on blackbody radiation
would not be expected to be informative about this. Thus, the informational
relevance of E1 to E2 was low, if not zero. However, by assuming QP , the
blackbody spectrum provides information about the size of h, thus constraining the
possible values that the constant could take. This makes it much more likely that
the value of the constant should be the one found, assuming that values close to the
one calculated using Planck’s radiation theory would be more likely than those that
do not provide numerical agreement. This makes the informational relevance of E1
to E2 quite high on the assumption of QP , in contrast to its value without the
assumption of QP . This yields a nonzero value for the unificatory power of QP with
respect to E1 and E2, again contributing directly to the degree of confirmation of
QP by those phenomena. Here, we add to background knowledge B Bohr’s specific
assumptions as outlined in Section 5.2, and a statement linking the general
quantum postulate to the specific application to stable atomic states.
After Bohr’s success with the hydrogen spectrum, other phenomena related to
atomic spectra were used as explicit tests for the value of h. James Franck and
Gustav Ludwig Hertz performed experiments on the energy of electrons colliding
with molecules of an inert gas or metal vapour (1914/1967). In particular, their
experiments with mercury vapour were able to help determine the value of h. This
is interesting because, as Gearhart (2014) points out, Franck and Hertz did not
mention Bohr’s atomic theory in their initial work. However, it was later
reinterpreted in the context of Bohr’s theory, and we can see how this can be
understood as using these experimental results to yield more information.
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In these experiments, electrons of a certain kinetic energy were introduced into
mercury vapour. It was known that at relatively high energies, the mercury gas
became ionised. However, below this level but at certain energy thresholds, the
electrons lost their kinetic energy; this was attributed to inelastic collisions between
the free electrons and those bound to mercury atoms. The fact that these only
occurred at discrete levels of energy of the introduced electrons was evidence for the
idea that the mercury gas atoms could only absorb energy in those discrete
quantities. These energy levels corresponded to the observed spectrum lines emitted
by mercury gas.
Since the experiment involved only quantities that were pre-determined or
measurable such as the energy of the introduced electrons, the voltage drop
corresponding to the loss of the electrons’ kinetic energy, and the frequency of
emitted energy in the spectrum, these results were used to calculate a value for
Planck’s constant. Franck and Hertz calculated that h had the value 6.59 · 10−27.
An analysis of the informational relevance of this experiment can be made
analogously to the ones given above.
6.3.4 Summary of Informational Relevance
I have presented several phenomena that were unified by the quantum postulate by
emphasizing the importance of constraining and measuring the numerical value of
Planck’s constant, which was an integral feature of QP . Below is a table
summarizing the values obtained from each of the phenomena discussed above. I
also include the value of h Millikan calculated in his (1916), discussion of which is
given in Chapter 3.
Summary of calculated values of h
Phenomenon Value in erg · sec
Blackbody radiation 6.55 · 10−27
Light quanta Order of 10−27
Photoelectric effect 6.56 · 10−27
Hydrogen emission spectrum 6.38 · 10−27
Mercury gas resonance radiation 6.59 · 10−27
These measurements are significant because they demonstrate the idea that
various observations, understood in terms of constraining information about a
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parameter, are able to render previously unrelated phenomena relevant to one
another by yielding information implicitly contained in those observations. By
increasing the informational relevance of each phenomenon to the other, the
unificatory power of the quantum postulate is raised. The above discussion
considered only pairwise informational relevance relations, but the generalization to
several phenomena yields the following (taking each E below to represent the results
of experiments from the five phenomena listed in the table):
U(E1, E2, E3, E4, E5;QP |B) =
I(E1, E2, E3, E4, E5|QP&B)− I(E1, E2, E3, E4, E5|B).
(6.8)
Thus, the unificatory power of the quantum hypothesis from the Bayesian
perspective is nonzero, and the degree of confirmation of QP is increased not only
by the individual phenomena, but by the fact that it makes those phenomena
relevant to one another. This provides epistemic justification for pursuing the
quantum hypothesis beyond the support the hypothesis gained individually from
each phenomenon discussed.
It is relatively straightforward to understand this result in the framework of
imprecise credences. Recall that an agent’s credal state is represented by a family C
of credence functions, each of which assigns a degree of belief to the general
quantum postulate, based on the background information B I outlined above. Thus,
an agent’s credence in QP will be imprecise, since the different members of C will
likely assign different values. However, the Equation 6.8 tells us that QP gains
support from its unificatory power. Given that all of the experimental results yield
values for h on B, it will be the case that any credence function in C will assign
nonzero informational relevance to the Ei’s, and thus that support for QP will be
raised in virtue of this unificatory power for each credence of C. Since an agent with
imprecise credences makes a judgment just in the case that all the members of C
agree about some fact, we obtain the result that the agent’s credence in QP should
be raised due to its unificatory power. While there will likely not be a definite value
by which Cr(QP ) is raised, this shows that informational relevance provides
support to a quantum postulate, even for an agent who has an imprecise credence in
the postulate. In the next section, I will draw some conclusions for the process of
theory pursuit based on this interpretation of unification.
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6.4 Further considerations
This analysis provides a formal explication of the fact that the quantum postulate
received support in virtue of its ability to unify various phenomena, and it is worth
noting that this type of argument was also historically considered to be of value. I
claim that this arises partly from the fact that alternative methods of justification
are often not available in early stages of a scientific theory’s development. For
instance, Norton details arguments given by Poincare´ and Ehrenfest, in which they
infer from observed phenomena to the result of quantum discontinuity (1993).
These are obviously very strong reasons to take a quantum postulate seriously.
However, due to the complex nature of such arguments, it is almost certainly the
case that they would not have been undertaken without prior evidence of the
desired result. In general, the ability to give a deductively valid argument for a
hypothesis only follows the stage at which pursuit of the hypothesis is based on
other reasons, and a unificatory argument can provide good epistemic warrant for
designating a hypothesis promising before deductive justifications are available.
Indeed, these arguments were not given until 1911 or later, despite the appearance
of the quantum hypothesis as early as 1900. Moreover, James Jeans explicitly
discusses Poincare´’s argument and is aware of its significance for quantum
discontinuity. Yet, in his 1924 Report on Radiation and the Quantum-Theory, he
cites the determination of the value of h via multiple methods as important
evidence for the necessity of some form of quantization. It is noteworthy that Jeans
evidently still found it beneficial to present this unificatory argument, even with
knowledge of a more traditional deductive justification.
Jeans’s work also leads me to my next point, which is that this type of
unification argument also underlines the importance of the consideration of a
general quantum postulate rather than the specific quantum conjectures. Jeans
stresses repeatedly that the physical interpretation of quantization is not clear
merely from the mathematical descriptions of phenomena.
It seems then to be abundantly proved that the transfer of energy must
in some way take place by jumps or jerks of amount  = hν, but
mathematical analysis gives no indication as to the physical nature of
these processes. The physical problem as to when, where and how the
jumps occur can be solved with much less certainty than the
mathematical problem, of which the solution has predicted the
occurrence of the energy jumps with a high degree of certainty. (Jeans,
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1924, p. 29)
[The laws] give no indication at all as to the seat of these quanta of
energy, whether they are to be looked for in the radiation or in matter.
(Jeans, 1924, p. 32)
These comments support my claim that the value of applying the quantum
postulate in several contexts was not to be found in the details of the applications,
such as with mechanisms of radiation exchange, but in the universal applicability of
the parameter h. In a 1913 speech to the Physical Society of Copenhagen, Bohr
says,
Planck’s theory would hardly have acquired general recognition merely
on the ground of its agreement with experiments on blackbody
radiation, but, as you know, the theory has also contributed quite
remarkably to the elucidation of many different physical phenomena,
such as specific heats, photoelectric effect, X-rays and the absorption of
heat rays by gases. These explanations involved more than the
qualitative assumption of a discontinuous transformation of energy, for
with the aid of Planck’s constant h it seems to be possible, at least
approximately, to account for a great number of phenomena about which
nothing could be said previously. (Bohr, 1922, p. 7)
Thus, the unificatory power of the idea of quantization was highly significant
according to Bohr as well, but this wide applicability would not have been possible
by focusing on individual conjectures rather than the general postulate. This is not
to say the individual conjectures were not necessary: the very specific application of
the idea of quantization in these contexts allows us to identify the particular
assumptions being used in a very limited domain. This allows us to define the
background information scientists were assuming in a consistent way. However,
understanding the experiments as measurements of h allows us to see how we gain
information about the general postulate.
This analysis is similar to that given of other episodes in history of science as
well, such as Newton’s argument for the inverse square force law, and his extension
of this law to the theory of universal gravitation. By using Kepler’s orbital laws,
observations of the moon’s orbit, and terrestrial phenomena, Newton is able to
argue for the specific inverse square value of the force of gravitation. In William
Harper’s reconstruction of Newton’s reasoning, “a theory succeeds empirically by
90
having its causal parameters receive convergent accurate measurements from the
phenomena it purports to explain” (2002, p. 185, emphasis in original).
Another excellent example is Jean Perrin’s determination of Avogadro’s
constant. Perrin began with Avogadro’s Hypothesis, which took into account the
known relations between temperature, pressure and volume of gases, and
hypothesized that equal volumes of different gases, under the same conditions of
temperature and pressure, contain equal numbers of molecules, N (Perrin,
1913/1916, p. 18). Perrin used several different methods to calculate Avogadro’s
number, including work on Brownian motion, blackbody radiation and alpha decay,
and showed that the number for N obtained by each method was extremely close —
on the same order of 1022 in each case.9 It is clear that there is a notion of
informational relevance in this case, with phenomena from different contexts yielding
information about the parameter N which could then be applied in other domains.
Wesley Salmon reconstructs Perrin’s argument in terms of a common cause
(1984). He argues that the agreement between the various methods of determining
Avogadro’s constant pointed to a common cause, and that this constituted evidence
for the existence of atoms. One might claim that a similar argument can be made in
the case of the quantum postulate, and that we should consider quantization of
energy as the underlying reason that caused the results of the experiments.
However, I would argue that characterizing the unificatory power of the quantum
postulate as being due to a common cause would be to overstate the strength of the
information available, since at the time in question, it was not at all clear how
quantization might be occurring, and no account of the underlying mechanisms was
forthcoming. In fact, there was significant disagreement on whether the
quantization was merely a useful mathematical technique, or due to the nature of
matter interacting with radiation, or perhaps due to the radiation itself. Despite
this, it was clear that the quantum postulate did possess unificatory power in the
informational relevance sense, and this minimal sense is all that is required to
provide the hypothesis with some confirmational force.
This argument is perhaps more in line with Janssen’s COIs, a broader notion
than that of a common cause. I believe that this idea better captures the role of
quantization of energy than a common cause, since a common origin can refer to
something as weak as an ‘embryonic idea.’ Thus, one might say that the idea that
energy of frequency ν at small scales should be considered in discrete packets of size
hν is what underlies the account of the various phenomena. However, the structure
9See Nye (1972) for a historical account of Perrin’s work.
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of my argument differs from Janssen’s 2002 discussion of COIs in a few key ways.
First, the evidentiary warrant that accrues to the quantum postulate in this
explication is not a matter of its explanatory power with respect to various
phenomena as it seems to be in the quote above. Although it is important that by
assuming the quantum postulate, one can account for several phenomena, the
structure of my argument relies on the fact that the results of experiments on these
phenomena can be turned into measurements of the parameter h, a crucial part of
the quantum postulate, thereby yielding information that is relevant in different
contexts. Thus, the evidence for the postulate comes not only from the fact that we
can infer from the postulate to the phenomena, but also from the phenomena to
something about the postulate. Second, although a common origin can be much
vaguer than a common cause, it is still the case that “good COIs should at least
provisionally identify some mechanism connecting the phenomena it groups
together” (Janssen, 2002, p. 466). I argue that the quantum postulate was
supported by the evidence despite the lack of a plausible mechanism underlying the
process of radiation and matter interaction. Finally, at the end of the paper,
Janssen points out that there is still a question of whether there is any epistemic
force behind COIs, or if they merely have pragmatic value. My treatment of the
quantum postulate within the Bayesian framework is meant to give an explicit
account of how such an inference can have epistemic warrant.
More recently, Janssen has characterized the force of a COI not as a legitimate
inference to the truth of a theory, but as an indicator that an idea is worth
pursuing. I am wholly in agreement with this, and in fact, I take it that this accords
well with how to understand the case I have presented. In particular, this fits well
with an analysis of Einstein’s treatment of Stokes’s Rule 1905. Recall that Einstein
showed that adopting the light quanta conjecture could account for the phenomenon
of Stokes’s Rule, R
N
βν2 ≤ RN βν1. However, we can see through this reasoning that
the quantum hypothesis entails Stokes’s Rule, regardless of the size of h. Thus, the
informational relevance of Stokes’s Rule to any other piece of evidence is 0, and by
definition, the unificatory power U of the quantum hypothesis for Stokes’s Rule and
any other piece of evidence is 0. As we have seen in the previous chapter, scientists
did not seem to consider the explanation of Stokes’s Rule a contribution to the
support for a quantum postulate. However, it seems that even though Stokes’s Rule
does not contribute to the evidence for the quantum postulate by way of its
unificatory power, it did provide at least some reason to think that the quantum
postulate was worthy of pursuit. We can see thus see Einstein’s argument in that
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paper, where he shows that a notion of quantization can be used to account for
several phenomena, as putting forth an argument for the promising nature of the
idea. Nevertheless, according to this analysis, the epistemic import of the postulate
arises from the informational relevance that can be derived from it.
6.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued that the type of unification displayed by the quantum
postulate can be understood in terms of informational relevance, which yields the
result that in a Bayesian confirmational framework, this unificatory power
contributed to the confirmation of a quantum postulate over and above the evidence
taken individually. One of the important aspects of this informational relevance is
the ability to turn experimental results into ways of constraining or measuring a
physical parameter. I have argued that in many of these cases, an account of the
mechanisms that would explain the observed behaviour were not available, which
makes a mechanistic story for the unification more difficult to provide. However, the
background knowledge to which one need be committed in order to accept the
epistemic confirmational force of the unification argument was relatively minimal; a
commitment to the reasonable accuracy of certain experimental apparatuses
provides enough background on which to make probabilistic judgments about the
evidence in question, without reference to the sometimes problematic theoretical
explanations and derivations of the evidence. While I do not deny that causal
explanations have their place in theoretical justification, I have provided an example
where informational relevance lends a postulate epistemic force, even though a
causal explanation is not available to us.
On the other hand, one might argue that what was driving scientists to pursue
theories incorporating quantization in each of the domains in question was
something like Kitcher’s idea of having a unified explanation of the phenomena.
This might very well capture scientists’ motivations. However, the epistemic force of
informational relevance is stronger since it makes clear that the experiments yielded
information about the parameter in particular. On this account, merely providing a
common explanation, such as Einstein’s explanation of Stokes’s Rule, does not help
support the postulate. Thus, I argue that this type of unification, while related to
these others, can be considered independently.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
In this dissertation, I have provided an evidentiary analysis of the early stages of the
development of quantum theory through the lens of theory pursuit, and I argued
that we can characterize this pursuit as a piecemeal process. The first half of the
dissertation focused on explaining this characterization in detail.
I first showed that there were a variety of specific conjectures related to
quantization being applied in different domains, with varied interpretations. I
argued that we can nevertheless identify a broader quantum postulate that
generalizes all these conjectures despite uncertainty or ambiguity about how to
apply this postulate in specific contexts. I then argued that it is possible to separate
the quantum postulate from different elements of the framework being used to
investigate it by examining the way that the particular quantum conjecture of light
quanta guided research in the context of experiments on the photoelectric effect. We
saw that the conjecture of light quanta was crucial for generating a prediction that
guided the experiments on this phenomenon, but that confirmation of the predicted
formula did not necessarily support the light quanta conjecture itself. However, the
experimental results did force agreement on a general postulate about quantization.
The term ‘piecemeal pursuit’ is meant to reflect several facts. First, the notion
of quantization was being deemed promising in various contexts, but there was no
overarching theoretical framework that included such a postulate, and so the
investigation of quantization had to be pieced together from its application in
different domains. Second, each domain was itself something of a piecemeal
investigation, since elements of classical theories were being used in conjunction with
conjectures and hypotheses that did not clearly fit within classical frameworks. By
examining some of the historical criticisms of this tension in the context of Planck’s
original quantum conjecture, I argued that we should understand the seemingly
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inconsistent assumptions as applications of principles in very limited domains.
This made it possible to employ a broadly Bayesian framework in the last part
of the dissertation to explicate some of the theoretical features that were operative
in this process of pursuit. Using this framework, I was able to provide a formal
explication of how agents with imprecise credences should consider the quantum
postulate as being supported due to the features of correct prediction, explanation
of previously known phenomena, and unificatory power. I first showed how the
experiments on the phtooelectric effect provided support for the quantum postulate
in terms of a correct prediction. I then argued that some of the support for the
postulate came by way of its ability to account for old evidence. In the process, I
suggested some modifications to a solution to the problem of old evidence by
introducing two additional assumptions that I claimed arise naturally out of
historical considerations. Finally, I showed that the quantum postulate is also
supported by a unification argument, where unification should be interpreted as
informational relevance of the various disparate domains of inquiry. This
informational relevance arises by interpreting experiments in the different domains
as yielding measurements of the numerical value of Planck’s constant h.
We thus have an example of the possibility of using more traditional methods of
confirmation to evaluate elements of theories in the context of pursuit. A crucial
aspect of this argument was that these Bayesian analyses apply to the general
postulate rather than either individual conjectures from each of the domains of
applicability, or the broader theoretical frameworks guiding the investigations. Thus,
we see that we can identify specific elements of theories that are promising, even
when there is no overall theoretical framework that is guiding the investigation. We
saw that while experimental results can force agreement about certain aspects of the
theory under consideration, this can also easily foster disagreement about how best
to proceed, such as whether one version of a theory should be pursued over another.
An important point is that this kind of divergence of opinion is in fact important
in the context of pursuit for reasons both epistemic and pragmatic. In this case, the
divergence of opinion had to do with how far one should generalize the quantum
postulate. The generality of a hypothesis is an interesting feature because it has to
do with how widely applicable it is, and a widely applicable hypothesis can be
fruitful in its account of a variety of phenomena. However, this wide applicability is
also important for two related but distinct epistemic reasons. The first is that the
more applications of an idea that we have, the more we can use these applications
to identify the essential elements of the hypothesis that are common to all its uses.
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The second arises from the unification argument, in which the existence of multiple
applications contributed directly to the support for the general postulate.
However, it was crucial that this wide applicability was tempered by the
specificity of Planck’s constant h. The inclusion of h is what made it possible to
give a unificatory argument in terms of informational relevance. Furthermore, it was
also responsible for features of the quantum postulate such as making predictions
that were later verified, and accounting for previously known phenomena. This
importance of h indicates that the methodological significance of wide applicability
goes beyond a commitment to explanatory unification: in my explication, an
important element of the unification arises from the possibility of gaining
information about the hypothesis in question from the experimental results. Thus,
even a general or widely applicable hypothesis must be rendered precise in some way.
This work has implications for theory pursuit because it shows that we can
consider a particular postulate or hypothesis to be promising, even when no
consistent, overarching scientific theory or framework is available in which to situate
research. Indeed, it is possible to identify good epistemic reasons for pursuit, in
addition to pragmatic ones. While the quantum postulate turned out to be
universal in a very fundamental way, the features of wide applicability and
specificity could potentially be used to identify promising features in other areas of
science as well. While the details of each case would vary, and the meaning of being
widely applicable and specific would require close study of individual cases, I take
my case study to have provided an example of this kind of inquiry.
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